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ON	  THE	  NORMATIVITY	  OF	  INTENTIONS	  
ABSTRACT	  
Suppose	  you	  intend	  now	  to	  φ	  at	  some	  future	  time	  t.	  However,	  when	  t	  has	  come	  you	  do	  not	  φ.	  	  
Something	  has	  gone	  wrong.	  This	  failing	  is	  not	  just	  a	  causal	  but	  also	  a	  normative	  failing.	  This	  
raises	  the	  question	  how	  to	  characterize	  this	  normativity.	  I	  discuss	  three	  alternative	  views.	  On	  
the	  first	  view,	  the	  fact	  that	  you	  do	  not	  execute	  your	  intention	  to	  φ	  is	  blameworthy	  only	  if	  the	  
balance	  of	  reasons	  pointed	  to	  φ-­‐ing.	  The	  fact	  that	  you	  intended	  to	  φ	  does	  not	  add	  to	  the	  
reasons	  for	  φ-­‐ing	  at	  t.	  On	  the	  second	  view,	  the	  fact	  that	  you	  do	  not	  execute	  your	  intention	  to	  
φ	  is	  blameworthy	  because	  you	  violate	  a	  requirement	  of	  rationality.	  Both	  these	  views	  have	  in	  
common	  that	  they	  deny	  that	  intending	  to	  φ	  at	  t	  creates	  a	  reason	  to	  φ	  at	  t.	  The	  third	  
alternative,	  the	  one	  I	  defend,	  claims	  that	  you	  often	  create	  reasons	  to	  φ	  by	  intending	  to	  φ.	  
INTRODUCTION	  
Suppose	  that	  at	  t1	  I	  formed	  an	  intention	  to	  φ	  at	  t2.	  However,	  at	  t2	  I	  don’t	  φ.	  For	  example,	  
suppose	  that	  yesterday	  I	  decided	  to	  make	  a	  phone	  call	  to	  a	  colleague	  today.	  However,	  today	  
I	  don’t	  make	  that	  phone	  call.	  Something	  has	  gone	  wrong.	  There	  are	  two	  senses	  in	  which	  
something	  can	  go	  wrong.	  First,	  there	  is	  a	  causal	  sense	  in	  which	  something	  can	  go	  wrong.	  
That	  is,	  the	  result	  –	  my	  failure	  to	  make	  that	  phone	  call	  –	  is	  unexpected	  and	  does	  not	  follow	  
the	  usual	  path	  of	  consequences.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  typical	  result	  of	  my	  earlier	  decision.	  This	  ‘causal	  
wrongness’	  is	  not	  what	  I	  want	  to	  discuss	  in	  this	  essay.	  Secondly,	  there	  is	  a	  normative	  sense	  
in	  which	  my	  decision	  to	  make	  that	  phone	  call	  has	  gone	  wrong.	  It	  makes	  my	  failure	  not	  only	  
unexpected	  but	  also	  blameworthy.	  Blame,	  here,	  is	  not	  necessarily	  moral.	  It	  can	  be	  morally	  
speaking	  a	  good	  thing	  that	  my	  intention	  to	  perpetrate	  some	  evil	  was	  not	  carried	  out.	  
Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  still	  the	  case	  that	  some	  normative	  failure	  has	  occurred	  in	  my	  failure	  to	  
execute	  my	  intention.	  Blame	  is	  a	  complicated	  matter	  and	  a	  full	  discussion	  of	  its	  features	  and	  
its	  relation	  to	  other	  concepts	  such	  as	  responsibility	  and	  freedom	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  vast	  body	  
of	  literature.	  In	  this	  essay,	  I	  will	  sidestep	  these	  issues.	  Instead,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  adjective	  
‘blameworthy’	  as	  a	  placeholder	  for	  the	  view	  that	  the	  mistake	  or	  the	  failure	  in	  question	  is	  
wrong	  in	  this	  broad	  and	  unspecified,	  normative	  sense.	  
A	  straightforward	  explanation	  of	  why	  my	  failure	  to	  make	  the	  phone	  call	  is	  blameworthy	  is	  
the	  following.	  In	  adopting	  the	  intention	  to	  make	  the	  phone	  call,	  I	  gave	  myself	  a	  reason	  to	  
make	  the	  phone	  call,	  which	  I	  subsequently	  ignored.	  Call	  this	  the	  naïve	  explanation	  of	  the	  
blameworthiness	  of	  my	  failure.	  If	  the	  naïve	  explanation	  is	  correct,	  then	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  
that	  intentions	  give	  reasons.	  Failure	  to	  act	  upon	  these	  reasons	  explains	  the	  blameworthiness	  
involved	  in	  not	  executing	  intentions.	  
Most	  authors,	  however,	  reject	  the	  naïve	  explanation.	  In	  one	  of	  his	  first	  papers	  on	  practical	  
reasoning	  John	  Broome	  expresses	  the	  rejection	  as	  follows:	  
The	  view	  that	  intentions	  are	  reasons	  is	  implausible.	  If	  you	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  do	  something,	  it	  
is	  implausible	  that	  you	  can	  give	  yourself	  a	  reason,	  just	  by	  forming	  the	  intention	  of	  doing	  it.	  
How	  could	  you	  create	  a	  reason	  for	  yourself	  out	  of	  nothing?	  Suppose,	  say,	  that	  you	  have	  no	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reason	  either	  for	  against	  doing	  some	  act,	  and	  you	  happen	  to	  decide	  to	  do	  it.	  Now	  you	  intend	  
to	  do	  it.	  So	  now,	  if	  intentions	  are	  reasons,	  you	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  do	  it.	  Since	  you	  have	  no	  
contrary	  reason	  not	  to	  do	  it,	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  is	  in	  favour	  of	  your	  doing	  it.	  You	  now	  
actually	  ought	  to	  do	  it,	  therefore.	  But	  this	  is	  implausible.	  It	  is	  implausible	  that	  just	  deciding	  to	  
do	  something	  can	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  it,	  when	  previously	  that	  was	  not	  the	  
case.1	  
Broome	  calls	  it	  the	  bootstrapping	  objection,	  in	  honor	  of	  Michael	  Bratman,	  who	  raised	  it	  in	  
his	  Intentions,	  Plans	  and	  Practical	  Reason.2	  Broome’s	  counter-­‐example	  in	  the	  quote	  may	  not	  
be	  the	  strongest.	  Most	  authors	  give	  the	  example	  of	  evil	  intentions	  to	  motivate	  the	  
bootstrapping	  objection.	  For	  example,	  suppose	  I	  intend	  to	  avail	  myself	  of	  an	  inheritance	  by	  
poisoning	  my	  rich	  uncle.	  On	  the	  naïve	  explanation	  I	  now	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  poison	  my	  rich	  
uncle	  that	  I	  did	  not	  have	  before	  and	  this	  seems	  objectionable	  as	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  poison	  
my	  uncle.	  Examples	  like	  this	  explain	  why	  the	  bootstrapping	  objection	  is	  widely	  shared	  in	  the	  
literature.3	  Though	  this	  objection	  is	  prevalent,	  it	  also	  poses	  a	  puzzle	  to	  most	  theorists,	  for	  
intentions	  matter	  in	  one’s	  deliberation.	  Or	  more	  generally,	  the	  ends	  that	  the	  agent	  has	  
adopted	  make	  a	  difference	  –	  a	  normative	  difference	  –	  to	  his	  practical	  deliberation.	  The	  
problem,	  then,	  is	  how	  that	  could	  be	  the	  case	  if	  intentions	  are	  not	  reasons.	  How	  can	  the	  
adoption	  of	  an	  intention	  make	  a	  difference	  in	  our	  reasons	  for	  action	  at	  the	  time	  of	  action	  if	  
an	  intention	  is	  not	  a	  reason?	  This	  raises	  a	  challenge	  for	  those	  who	  reject	  the	  naïve	  
explanation.	  The	  phenomenology	  suggests	  that	  intentions	  make	  a	  normative	  difference.	  At	  
the	  same	  time,	  the	  bootstrapping	  objection	  suggests	  that	  intentions	  are	  not	  reasons.	  The	  
challenge	  then	  is	  how	  to	  avoid	  this	  apparent	  dilemma	  
There	  are,	  roughly,	  two	  types	  of	  answers	  to	  the	  challenge	  in	  the	  literature.	  The	  first	  answer	  
says	  that	  intentions	  are	  not	  normative	  at	  all	  but	  that	  they	  merely	  report	  the	  reasons	  for	  
action.	  This	  explains	  why	  they	  seem	  to	  be	  normative.	  The	  second	  answer	  holds	  that	  there	  is	  
more	  than	  one	  kind	  of	  normativity	  and	  that	  the	  normativity	  of	  intentions	  is	  different	  from	  
the	  sort	  of	  reasons	  that	  Broome	  is	  talking	  about	  in	  the	  quote	  above.	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  argue,	  
first,	  that	  both	  answers	  leave	  something	  to	  be	  desired.	  Secondly,	  I	  argue	  that	  an	  elaboration	  
of	  naïve	  explanation	  is	  plausible	  and	  that	  this	  version	  gives	  us	  the	  tools	  to	  explain	  the	  
normative	  nature	  of	  intentions.	  For	  reasons	  that	  will	  become	  clear,	  I	  call	  this	  version	  the	  
authority	  view.	  The	  upshot	  of	  that	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  bootstrapping	  objection	  is	  not	  as	  
devastating	  as	  the	  literature	  suggests	  it	  is	  and	  that	  the	  apparent	  dilemma	  is	  just	  that:	  merely	  
apparent.	  
In	  the	  next	  sections,	  I	  introduce	  some	  theoretic	  background	  to	  the	  discussion.	  I	  discuss	  the	  
concept	  of	  reasons,	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  intentions,	  and	  show	  how	  intentions	  make	  a	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444.	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difference	  in	  practical	  reasoning.	  Next,	  I	  will	  discuss	  myth	  theory	  as	  formulated	  by	  Joseph	  
Raz	  and	  others.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  it	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  intention.	  I	  
then	  proceed	  to	  discuss	  two	  flavor	  theory	  according	  to	  which	  the	  type	  of	  reasons	  that	  are	  
generated	  by	  intentions	  is	  very	  different	  from	  ‘normal’	  reasons	  of	  action	  and	  that	  this	  
explains	  the	  normative	  phenomenology	  of	  intentions.	  In	  the	  last	  two	  sections,	  I	  present	  the	  
authority	  view	  and	  compare	  it	  with	  myth	  theory	  and	  two	  flavor	  theory.	  
REASONS	  AND	  INTENTIONS	  
The	  phenomenology	  of	  intentions	  is	  such	  that	  they	  make	  a	  normative	  difference	  in	  our	  
practical	  deliberations,	  or	  so	  I	  claimed	  above.	  I	  will	  now	  proceed	  to	  make	  this	  claim	  
plausible.	  The	  argument	  makes	  two	  particular	  assumptions,	  first,	  about	  what	  a	  reason	  is	  
and,	  secondly,	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  intentions.	  This	  will	  not	  be	  a	  knock-­‐down	  argument	  that	  
would	  convince	  even	  the	  most	  skeptical	  reader,	  for	  it	  is	  always	  possible	  to	  reject	  one	  of	  
these	  assumptions.	  Since	  the	  assumptions	  are	  widely	  shared,	  it	  gives	  some	  reasons	  why	  one	  
could	  accept	  the	  normative	  phenomenology	  of	  intentions	  and	  their	  role	  in	  practical	  
deliberation.	  
What	  is	  a	  reason	  to	  φ?	  In	  its	  most	  general	  (and	  trivial)	  sense,	  a	  reason	  to	  φ	  is	  a	  consideration	  
that	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  φ-­‐ing.4	  To	  φ	  (e.g.,	  to	  act	  or	  to	  think)	  for	  a	  reason	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case,	  
first,	  that	  φ-­‐ing	  is	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  reason	  to	  φ.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  reason	  to	  φ	  and	  yet	  I	  do	  not	  
φ,	  I	  go	  against	  the	  reason	  to	  φ	  ceteris	  paribus.5	  My	  action	  or	  inaction	  is	  a	  failure	  to	  respond	  
to	  this	  reason.	  Secondly,	  reasons	  are	  considerations	  that	  are	  such	  that	  they	  can	  be	  known	  or	  
believed.	  If	  I	  φ	  for	  a	  reason	  then	  if,	  in	  addition	  to	  conforming	  to	  that	  reason,	  I	  have	  the	  
insight	  that	  there	  is	  this	  reason	  to	  φ.	  Finally,	  acting	  for	  a	  reason	  implies	  that	  the	  insight	  that	  
there	  is	  this	  reason	  to	  φ	  motivates	  the	  agent	  to	  φ.	  
Let	  me	  give	  an	  example.	  Suppose	  there	  is	  a	  reason	  that	  my	  teenage	  son	  should	  go	  to	  bed	  at	  
9PM:	  tomorrow	  is	  a	  school	  day,	  teenagers	  need	  a	  lot	  of	  sleep,	  he	  will	  have	  to	  get	  up	  early,	  
etc.	  Suppose	  his	  mother	  tells	  him	  to	  go	  to	  bed	  –	  or	  else	  –	  and	  he	  goes.	  He	  conforms	  to	  the	  
reason	  to	  go	  to	  bed	  in	  time,	  but	  he	  does	  not	  act	  on	  that	  reason.	  He	  goes	  to	  bed	  in	  order	  to	  
avoid	  the	  harsh	  words	  of	  his	  mother.	  Suppose,	  in	  addition,	  that	  my	  son	  also	  believes	  it	  is	  a	  
good	  thing	  to	  go	  to	  bed	  in	  time.	  He	  is	  aware	  of	  all	  the	  considerations	  in	  favor	  of	  his	  going	  to	  
bed	  by	  9PM.	  Again	  he	  goes	  to	  bed	  at	  9PM	  but	  not	  because	  he	  believes	  it	  to	  be	  a	  good	  idea	  
(he	  does)	  but	  because	  his	  mother	  tells	  him	  to	  go	  –	  or	  else.	  If	  it	  were	  up	  to	  him,	  he	  would	  
watch	  his	  favorite	  TV	  show	  until	  10PM.	  Only	  if	  my	  son	  goes	  to	  bed	  at	  9PM	  because	  he	  
believes	  that	  these	  are	  a	  good	  reasons	  to	  go	  to	  bed	  at	  9PM	  and	  this	  belief	  somehow	  
motivates	  him,	  he	  is	  acting	  for	  this	  reason.	  Therefore,	  a	  reason	  is	  not	  just	  a	  consideration	  in	  
favor	  of	  something.	  A	  reason	  is	  such	  that	  it	  can	  fulfill	  these	  additional	  functional	  roles	  in	  
one’s	  deliberation	  as	  well.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Thomas	  Scanlon,	  What	  We	  Owe	  to	  Each	  Other	  (Belknap	  Press	  of	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  18.	  
5	  In	  include	  a	  ceteris	  paribus	  condition,	  because	  it	  could	  be	  the	  case	  that	  there	  are	  other,	  stronger,	  
reasons	  not	  to	  φ,	  in	  which	  case	  a	  failure	  to	  φ	  does	  not	  imply	  a	  failure	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  reason	  to	  φ.	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On	  this	  understanding	  of	  what	  a	  reason	  is,	  intentions	  could	  be	  reasons.	  There	  is	  nothing	  in	  
the	  nature	  of	  an	  intention	  that	  rules	  out	  any	  of	  these	  functional	  roles:	  you	  can	  act	  as	  they	  
direct,	  you	  can	  be	  aware	  that	  you	  have	  an	  intention	  and	  you	  can	  be	  motivated	  by	  your	  
intention.	  	  
If	  this	  is	  how	  we	  could	  think	  of	  reasons,	  we	  should	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  intention.	  
Consider	  again	  my	  failure	  to	  execute	  my	  intention	  to	  call	  my	  colleague.	  There	  are	  many	  
circumstances	  that	  could	  explain	  my	  failure	  to	  make	  that	  phone	  call.	  It	  could	  be,	  for	  
example,	  that	  at	  t2	  I	  was	  being	  coerced	  into	  doing	  something	  else	  which	  prevented	  me	  from	  
making	  the	  phone	  call.	  This	  explains	  why	  I	  did	  not	  make	  the	  phone	  call,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  show	  
that	  my	  failure	  is	  blameworthy.	  
There	  are	  failures	  that	  are	  blameworthy.	  First,	  it	  could	  be	  that	  I	  failed	  to	  take	  into	  account	  
that	  my	  colleague	  is	  ill	  and	  cannot	  answer	  the	  phone.	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  execute	  the	  
intention,	  but	  not	  because	  of	  some	  active	  intervention	  from	  outside	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
coercion.	  If	  I	  was	  unaware	  of	  this	  circumstance,	  I	  may	  be	  excused6,	  but	  if	  I	  believed	  he	  is	  too	  
ill	  to	  answer	  the	  phone	  and	  yet	  adopted	  the	  intention	  to	  make	  the	  phone	  call,	  I	  am	  
blameworthy.	  My	  decision	  was	  not	  consistent	  with	  what	  I	  believed	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  
Secondly,	  another	  reason	  for	  blame	  could	  be	  that,	  in	  spite	  of	  my	  decision	  to	  make	  this	  
phone	  call,	  I	  never	  made	  sure	  that	  I	  would	  have	  the	  means	  available.	  For	  example,	  I	  did	  not	  
bring	  my	  cell	  phone,	  did	  not	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  battery	  was	  sufficiently	  charged,	  or	  did	  not	  
take	  care	  that	  I	  would	  be	  in	  the	  neighborhood	  of	  a	  phone.	  In	  that	  case,	  there	  is	  a	  good	  
explanation	  as	  to	  why	  my	  decision	  to	  make	  a	  phone	  call	  was	  never	  carried	  out,	  and	  there	  is	  
some	  justification	  for	  blaming	  me	  as	  I	  did	  not	  pursue	  the	  necessary	  means	  to	  carry	  out	  my	  
decision.	  
Finally,	  I	  could	  simply	  have	  reconsidered	  my	  decision.	  I	  may	  have	  come	  to	  believe	  it	  is	  not	  
important	  to	  make	  that	  phone	  call,	  or	  have	  found	  something	  better	  to	  do	  at	  t2.	  Such	  
reconsideration	  need	  not	  be	  justification	  for	  blame.	  Perhaps	  it	  was	  a	  bad	  idea	  to	  make	  that	  
phone	  call	  and	  I	  should	  never	  have	  adopted	  the	  intention	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Alternatively,	  I	  
may	  have	  received	  new	  information	  in	  the	  mean	  time	  that	  warrants	  reconsideration.	  
Arguably,	  in	  such	  cases	  I	  am	  justified	  in	  reconsidering.	  However,	  there	  are	  also	  
circumstances	  in	  which	  reconsideration	  is	  blameworthy.	  It	  could	  be	  that	  in	  rehearsing	  the	  
reasons	  for	  and	  against	  making	  that	  phone	  call	  now	  and	  reconsidering	  –	  again	  and	  again	  –	  I	  
display	  a	  kind	  of	  fickleness	  that	  is	  blameworthy.7	  	  
These	  three	  explanations	  for	  my	  failure	  to	  execute	  my	  intentions	  –	  inconsistent	  beliefs,	  
means-­‐end	  incoherence,	  and	  fickleness	  –	  point	  to	  the	  various	  functions	  that	  intentions	  play	  
in	  our	  mental	  lives.8	  These	  functions	  are	  elegantly	  summed	  up	  by	  the	  so-­‐called	  planning	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  That	  is,	  I	  might	  be	  off	  the	  hook	  for	  not	  making	  the	  phone	  call,	  however,	  it	  is	  an	  open	  question	  as	  to	  
whether	  my	  unawareness	  is	  a	  failure.	  
7	  Richard	  Holton,	  Willing,	  Wanting,	  Waiting	  (Oxford	  [Eng.] ;	  New	  York:	  Clarendon	  Press ;	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2009),	  121–124.	  
8	  There	  are	  more	  circumstances	  in	  which	  a	  blameworthy	  failure	  of	  the	  execution	  of	  one’s	  intention	  
occurs.	  One	  could	  forget	  one’s	  decision	  or	  one	  could	  be	  weak	  willed	  in	  the	  sense	  identified	  by	  Richard	  
Holton,	  “Intention	  and	  Weakness	  of	  Will,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  96,	  no.	  5	  (1999):	  241–262.	  In	  all	  
	   5	  
theory	  of	  intention	  as	  developed	  by	  Michael	  Bratman,	  the	  basic	  elements	  of	  which	  are	  
widely	  accepted	  nowadays.9	  Let	  me	  rehearse	  the	  elements	  of	  that	  theory	  here,	  as	  it	  will	  
inform	  much	  of	  our	  subsequent	  discussion.	  
We	  are	  rational	  agents,	  but	  only	  up	  to	  a	  degree.	  We	  are	  constrained	  in	  all	  kinds	  of	  ways	  in	  
the	  exercise	  of	  our	  rationality.	  Many	  of	  these	  constraints	  are	  internal.	  We	  lack	  the	  
wherewithal	  to	  process	  all	  the	  available	  information	  correctly.	  We	  have	  difficulties	  in	  
assessing	  the	  relevance	  of	  information.	  In	  addition,	  there	  are	  external	  constraints.	  Often,	  we	  
have	  limited	  time	  and	  energy	  to	  make	  our	  decisions.	  This	  further	  compromises	  our	  rational	  
abilities.	  
Given	  these	  constraints,	  we	  and	  other	  creatures	  like	  us,	  need	  to	  adapt	  our	  deliberation	  
processes	  to	  deal	  with	  these	  constraints.	  The	  answer,	  or	  rather,	  our	  answer,	  is	  that	  we	  form	  
future-­‐oriented	  intentions,	  which	  structure	  our	  deliberation.	  According	  to	  Bratman	  
intentions	  are	  special	  mental	  states	  that	  are	  not	  reducible	  to	  combinations	  of	  beliefs	  and	  
desires.	  Rather,	  they	  function	  in	  specific	  ways	  so	  as	  to	  meet	  the	  challenges	  that	  the	  
constraints	  put	  on	  our	  deliberations.	  
To	  this	  end,	  intentions	  have	  certain	  characteristics.	  First,	  they	  typically	  are	  partial.	  That	  is,	  
we	  rarely	  adopt	  a	  completely	  specified	  intention.	  Instead,	  we	  unburden	  our	  deliberations	  by	  
the	  adoption	  of	  a	  partial	  intention	  that	  then	  is	  further	  filled	  in	  ‘as	  we	  go	  along’.	  So,	  for	  
example,	  I	  first	  set	  the	  goal	  of	  making	  that	  phone	  call	  and	  only	  then	  do	  I	  start	  deliberating	  
about	  when	  to	  call.	  By	  deciding	  to	  make	  that	  phone	  call,	  I	  do	  not	  leave	  it	  up	  to	  the	  very	  last	  
minute	  whether	  or	  not	  I	  shall	  call.	  Secondly,	  because	  of	  this	  partiality,	  intentions	  are	  
hierarchical.	  The	  intention	  to	  adopt	  certain	  goals	  embeds	  intentions	  about	  the	  means	  to	  
realize	  those	  goals.	  Once	  I	  adopt	  the	  goal	  of	  making	  that	  phone	  call,	  I	  can	  make	  decisions	  
about	  when	  and	  where	  to	  call.	  The	  intention	  when	  to	  call	  presupposes	  the	  ‘higher’	  intention	  
to	  make	  that	  call.	  These	  two	  features	  of	  partiality	  and	  hierarchy	  allow	  us	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  
constraints	  on	  our	  deliberation.	  Complex	  decisions	  are	  dissolved	  into	  more	  manageable	  
decision	  problems.	  Deliberation	  about	  the	  place	  and	  time	  of	  the	  important	  phone	  call	  is	  
postponed	  until	  the	  decision	  as	  to	  whether	  to	  make	  the	  phone	  call	  is	  resolved.	  
These	  features	  constrain	  on	  our	  intentions.	  First,	  intentions	  need	  to	  be	  internally	  consistent.	  
That	  is,	  they	  need	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  all	  that	  you	  believe	  about	  the	  world	  and	  about	  your	  
abilities.10	  What	  is	  more,	  intentions	  need	  to	  be	  consistent	  with	  your	  other	  intentions.	  
Secondly,	  intentions	  need	  to	  satisfy	  means-­‐end	  coherence.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
those	  cases	  there	  is	  a	  blameworthy	  failing	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  reducible	  to	  the	  types	  of	  failures	  
mentioned	  here.	  
9	  Bratman,	  Intention,	  Plans,	  and	  Practical	  Reason;	  Michael	  Bratman,	  Faces	  of	  Intention:	  Selected	  
Essays	  on	  Intention	  and	  Agency	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999);	  Michael	  Bratman,	  
Structures	  of	  Agency:	  Essays	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007).	  
10	  Actually,	  this	  is	  too	  quick.	  In	  deliberation	  we	  take	  some	  things	  as	  ‘given’.	  For	  example,	  in	  deciding	  
whether	  to	  bring	  an	  umbrella	  or	  take	  a	  raincoat	  I	  take	  it	  as	  given	  that	  it	  will	  rain	  –	  even	  though,	  I	  
might	  not	  be	  sure	  that	  it	  actually	  will	  rain.	  Similarly,	  in	  deliberating	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  take	  the	  bicycle	  
to	  work,	  I	  take	  it	  that	  I	  have	  the	  stamina	  and	  skill	  to	  ride	  my	  bicycle	  all	  the	  way	  to	  work	  –	  even	  though	  
I	  may	  not	  be	  completely	  sure	  that	  I	  can.	  In	  both	  cases,	  then,	  my	  attitude	  is	  not	  belief	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  
‘degrees-­‐of-­‐confidence’	  attitude.	  Neither	  is	  it	  the	  attitude	  of	  ‘full	  belief’.	  Instead	  these	  attitudes	  are	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Intentions	  structure	  deliberation	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  First,	  they	  create	  the	  context	  for	  
further	  deliberation	  and	  establish	  standards	  of	  relevance	  for	  options	  considered	  in	  
deliberation.	  Once	  you	  have	  adopted	  the	  intention	  to	  make	  the	  phone	  call,	  you	  have	  the	  
problem	  of	  settling	  upon	  a	  time.	  You	  would	  not	  face	  that	  problem	  if	  you	  had	  not	  made	  the	  
initial	  decision	  to	  make	  that	  phone	  call.	  Secondly,	  intentions	  typically	  constrain	  further	  
deliberation	  by	  placing	  ‘filters	  of	  admissibility’,	  on	  further	  deliberation.	  My	  decision	  to	  call	  
my	  colleague	  at	  3	  PM	  rules	  out	  attending	  a	  faculty	  meeting	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  
Intentions	  can	  only	  function	  in	  these	  ways	  if	  they	  have	  some	  inertia	  and	  resist	  
reconsideration.	  It	  is	  not	  impossible	  to	  reconsider.	  However,	  once	  a	  decision	  has	  been	  made	  
and	  an	  intention	  has	  been	  adopted,	  the	  focus	  of	  deliberation	  is	  on	  other	  matters	  and	  the	  
earlier	  decision	  is	  taken	  as	  a	  given	  constraint	  on	  further	  deliberation.	  Intentions	  can	  only	  
constrain	  further	  deliberation	  in	  this	  way	  if	  they	  ‘stay	  on	  the	  scene’.	  
Finally,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  appreciate	  that	  on	  this	  view	  intentions	  are	  not	  just	  mental	  attitudes	  or	  
states	  that	  have	  causal	  consequences	  ‘down	  stream’.	  Rather,	  intentions	  are	  also	  normative.	  
Their	  phenomenology	  is	  such	  that	  comes	  with	  various	  commitments	  about	  how	  to	  act	  and	  
how	  to	  deliberate.	  This	  means	  that	  it	  is	  not	  conceptually	  impossible	  to	  deviate	  from	  an	  
intention.	  	  
With	  this	  rough	  characterization	  of	  intentions	  in	  place,	  we	  can	  understand	  how	  the	  three	  
normative	  failures	  I	  outlined	  above	  are	  cases	  where	  my	  intentions	  failed	  and	  why	  this	  failure	  
is	  blameworthy	  in	  the	  broad	  and	  unspecified	  sense.	  Consider	  first	  the	  case	  where	  I	  adopted	  
the	  intention	  to	  call	  my	  colleague	  while	  I	  knew	  he	  could	  not	  answer	  the	  phone.	  In	  that	  case,	  
my	  intention	  failed	  to	  satisfy	  the	  demand	  of	  internal	  consistency.	  I	  settled	  upon	  a	  course	  of	  
action	  that	  was	  incompatible	  with	  my	  beliefs	  about	  the	  world.	  In	  the	  second	  case,	  where	  I	  
adopted	  the	  goal	  of	  making	  the	  phone	  call,	  but	  omitted	  to	  bring	  my	  cell	  phone,	  my	  intention	  
was	  not	  means-­‐end	  coherent.	  Finally,	  the	  third	  kind	  of	  failure,	  where	  I	  failed	  to	  execute	  my	  
intention	  because	  of	  continuous	  reconsiderations	  is	  a	  case	  where	  my	  intention	  failed	  to	  have	  
sufficient	  inertia.	  
This	  provides	  the	  tools	  to	  appreciate	  the	  initial	  plausibility	  of	  the	  view	  that	  intentions	  matter	  
normatively.	  According	  to	  the	  planning	  theory	  once	  one	  adopts	  an	  intention	  one	  submits	  to	  
constraints	  that	  shape	  further	  deliberation.	  These	  constraints	  are	  normative:	  they	  are	  
considerations	  to	  deliberate	  in	  a	  certain	  manner	  (e.g.,	  being	  consistent	  with	  one’s	  beliefs),	  to	  
pursue	  certain	  actions	  (e.g.,	  those	  means	  that	  are	  prescribed	  by	  means-­‐end	  coherence),	  and	  
to	  consider	  the	  adoption	  of	  certain	  ends	  settled	  (because	  of	  inertia).	  Such	  considerations	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
so-­‐called	  ‘acceptances’:	  one	  takes	  certain	  things	  as	  ‘given’	  in	  the	  context	  of	  deliberation	  and	  decides	  
accordingly.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  one	  makes	  decisions	  against	  a	  background	  of	  beliefs	  about	  the	  world.	  
These	  beliefs	  are	  beliefs	  in	  both	  the	  degrees-­‐of-­‐confidence	  sense	  and	  the	  full	  sense;	  in	  both	  a	  
dispositional	  and	  actual	  sense	  –	  but	  not	  the	  acceptance	  sense.	  For	  example,	  in	  deciding	  whether	  or	  
not	  to	  make	  that	  phone	  call,	  I	  do	  believe	  dispositionally	  that	  the	  moon	  orbits	  Earth	  and	  I	  do	  actually	  
believe	  that	  the	  person	  I	  try	  to	  reach	  works	  at	  the	  same	  university	  as	  I	  do.	  See	  also,	  Michael	  Bratman,	  
“Practical	  Reasoning	  and	  Acceptance	  in	  a	  Context,”	  Mind:	  A	  Quarterly	  Review	  of	  Philosophy	  101,	  no.	  
401	  (1992):	  1–15;	  L.	  Jonathan	  Cohen,	  “Belief	  and	  Acceptance,”	  Mind	  98,	  no.	  391	  (July	  1989):	  367–389;	  
L.	  Jonathan	  Cohen,	  An	  Essay	  on	  Belief	  and	  Acceptance	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1992);	  Bruno	  
Verbeek,	  “Feasible	  Intentions,”	  Unpublished	  Manuscript	  (Leiden,	  November	  2010).	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fulfill	  the	  functional	  roles	  that	  reasons	  play	  in	  deliberation	  in	  the	  broad	  and	  almost	  trivial	  
way	  I	  characterized	  reasons	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  section.	  
What	  is	  more,	  one	  can	  appreciate	  why	  the	  naïve	  view	  comes	  naturally.	  If	  intentions	  are	  
essentially	  normative	  states	  of	  mind	  and	  their	  normativity	  appears	  to	  us	  as	  reasons,	  the	  
conclusion	  is	  plausible	  that	  intentions	  give	  the	  agent	  reasons.	  Given	  the	  normative	  
phenomenology	  of	  intentions	  it	  seems	  we	  can	  bootstrap	  reasons	  into	  existence.	  For	  
example,	  in	  forming	  the	  intention	  to	  avail	  myself	  of	  an	  inheritance	  by	  poisoning	  my	  rich	  
uncle	  who	  has	  named	  me	  as	  sole	  heir	  to	  his	  fortunes,	  I	  am	  committed	  to	  see	  to	  it	  that	  this	  
intention	  is	  consistent	  with	  what	  I	  believe	  to	  be	  the	  case	  and	  with	  my	  other	  intentions.	  In	  
case	  of	  a	  conflict	  with	  other	  intentions,	  I	  may	  have	  to	  give	  up	  my	  intention	  to	  poison	  my	  
uncle,	  or	  reconsider	  those	  other	  intentions.	  Furthermore,	  I	  have	  given	  myself	  a	  reason	  to	  
acquire	  poison	  and	  all	  kinds	  of	  other	  relevant	  means	  to	  my	  purpose.	  Finally,	  I	  have	  reason	  to	  
refrain	  from	  reconsidering	  my	  plan	  to	  poison	  my	  uncle	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  new	  information.	  
Of	  course,	  this	  is	  questionable	  bootstrapping:	  there	  should	  be	  no	  pressure	  to	  reconsider	  
intentions	  that	  are	  in	  conflict	  with	  this	  new	  intention;	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  acquire	  poison	  in	  
order	  to	  execute	  my	  plan,	  and,	  finally,	  even	  though	  there	  is	  no	  new	  information,	  I	  really	  
ought	  to	  reconsider	  and	  repudiate	  my	  plan.	  
MYTH	  THEORY	  
So	  how	  are	  we	  to	  avoid	  bootstrapping,	  while	  still	  making	  room	  for	  the	  idea	  that	  our	  
intentions	  matter	  normatively?	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  first	  type	  of	  answer:	  myth	  
theory.11	  According	  to	  myth	  theory,	  intentions	  do	  not	  generate	  normative	  pressure	  at	  all.	  
The	  challenge	  for	  this	  type	  of	  answer	  then	  is	  to	  account	  for	  the	  normative	  phenomenology	  
of	  intentions.	  Myth	  theory	  has	  a	  radical	  answer.	  This	  phenomenology	  rests	  on	  an	  error;	  an	  
understandable	  error	  –	  but	  an	  error	  nevertheless.	  
The	  most	  straightforward	  way	  in	  which	  one	  could	  argue	  for	  this	  is	  as	  follows.	  There	  are	  all	  
kinds	  of	  reasons	  that	  favor	  actions.	  Sometimes	  these	  considerations	  (or	  combinations	  of	  
such	  consideration)	  are	  such	  that	  not	  just	  pro	  tanto,	  but	  also	  pro	  toto	  a	  certain	  course	  of	  
action	  for	  a	  particular	  agent	  in	  a	  particular	  situation	  is	  favored.12	  Under	  such	  circumstances	  
such	  an	  agent	  should	  decide	  to	  perform	  that	  particular	  action	  and	  pursue	  the	  relevant	  
means.	  A	  decision	  that	  issues	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  an	  intention	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  piece	  of	  
practical	  deliberation	  –	  of	  weighing	  and	  rehearsing	  the	  reasons	  for	  and	  against	  it.	  This	  result,	  
the	  intention,	  cannot	  itself	  be	  a	  reason	  for	  the	  action	  since	  that	  would	  amount	  to	  a	  double	  
counting	  the	  reasons	  (i.e.,	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  action	  and	  then	  the	  reasons	  as	  contained	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  The	  term	  ‘myth	  theory’	  in	  this	  connection	  is	  due	  to	  Bratman.	  Michael	  E.	  Bratman,	  “Intention	  
Rationality,”	  Philosophical	  Explorations	  12,	  no.	  3	  (2011):	  227–241;	  Michael	  E.	  Bratman,	  “Intention,	  
Practical	  Rationality,	  and	  Self-­‐governance,”	  Ethics	  119,	  no.	  3	  (2009):	  411–443.	  Defenders	  of	  myth	  
theory	  are	  Joseph	  Raz	  and	  Niko	  Kolodny.	  Raz,	  “The	  Myth	  of	  Instrumental	  Rationality”;	  Niko	  Kolodny,	  
“Why	  Be	  Rational?,”	  Mind	  114,	  no.	  455	  (2005):	  509–563.	  
12	  I	  prefer	  the	  expression	  ‘pro	  toto’	  over	  ‘all	  things	  considered’	  that	  is	  popular	  in	  the	  literature,	  
because	  it	  is	  not	  the	  consideration	  of	  reasons	  that	  is	  important	  but	  rather	  the	  ‘weight’	  of	  all	  reasons	  
(assuming	  that	  the	  metaphore	  of	  ‘weight’	  is	  attractive).	  Put	  differently,	  ‘all	  things	  considered’	  
suggests	  that	  the	  difference	  with	  a	  pro	  tanto	  reason	  is	  epistemic,	  whereas	  ‘pro	  toto’	  rightly	  suggests	  
that	  the	  difference	  is	  metaphysical.	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the	  intention).	  Therefore,	  the	  intention,	  the	  end	  product	  of	  deliberation,	  does	  not	  give	  a	  
reason	  for	  that	  action	  at	  all.	  Rather,	  the	  intention	  rapports	  the	  reasons	  for	  and	  against	  the	  
action.	  
The	  rapport	  need	  not	  be	  definite.	  It	  could	  be	  that	  new	  information	  reaches	  the	  agent	  in	  
which	  case	  the	  intention	  can	  be	  revised.	  The	  rapport,	  therefore,	  is	  an	  interim	  rapport	  of	  the	  
reasons	  for	  and	  against	  the	  action.	  Rapports	  do	  not	  create	  new	  reasons:	  they	  just	  sum	  up	  
the	  reasons.	  The	  error	  of	  thinking	  that	  an	  intention	  creates	  reasons	  is	  the	  error	  of	  regarding	  
the	  summing	  up	  of	  reasons	  as	  a	  reason	  itself.	  
This	  clearly	  avoids	  bootstrapping,	  but	  is	  the	  myth	  view	  correct	  and	  does	  it	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  
normative	  phenomenology	  of	  intentions?	  First	  we	  need	  to	  refine	  the	  interim	  report	  view	  
that	  underlies	  myth	  theory	  so	  as	  to	  render	  it	  more	  plausible.	  
Consider	  the	  question	  what	  to	  do	  with	  my	  life.	  There	  are	  lots	  of	  projects	  that	  are	  worthy	  to	  
pursue.	  Consequently,	  there	  are	  lots	  of	  reasons	  for	  all	  kinds	  of	  actions.	  There	  is	  a	  reason	  to	  
learn	  to	  play	  piano;	  there	  is	  a	  good	  reason	  to	  study	  the	  collected	  works	  of	  David	  Hume,	  etc.,	  
etc.	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  live	  up	  to	  all	  these	  reasons	  in	  the	  course	  of	  one	  lifetime.	  So	  one	  has	  to	  
choose	  and	  opt	  for	  the	  best	  of	  all	  these	  projects,	  i.e.,	  adopt	  those	  reasons	  in	  one’s	  intentions	  
that	  are	  the	  strongest.	  This	  presupposes	  that	  these	  reasons	  are	  comparable,	  but	  often	  they	  
are	  not.	  It	  is	  indeterminate	  whether	  studying	  the	  piano	  is	  more	  important	  and	  more	  valuable	  
(and	  hence	  a	  stronger	  reason)	  than	  dedicating	  one’s	  life	  to	  philosophy.	  There	  is	  not	  a	  pro	  
toto	  reason.	  Both	  are	  worthy	  causes	  but	  they	  are	  incomparable	  in	  value	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  
reasons	  to	  pursue	  the	  one	  or	  the	  other	  are	  incomparable	  too.	  The	  agent,	  then,	  will	  have	  to	  
‘pick’	  one	  or	  the	  other.13	  Here	  reason	  cannot	  guide	  you	  other	  than	  telling	  you	  to	  pursue	  one	  
of	  these	  projects	  as	  opposed	  to	  not	  pursuing	  valuable	  projects	  at	  all.	  Suppose	  you	  act	  on	  this	  
reason	  and	  pick	  the	  project	  of	  studying	  the	  piano.	  This	  picking	  is	  the	  result	  of	  an	  intention,	  
so	  if	  the	  interim	  report	  theory	  is	  correct,	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	  studying	  the	  piano	  is	  
supported	  by	  reasons	  pro	  toto.	  But	  it	  is	  not:	  picking	  a	  worthy	  project	  to	  pursue	  is	  supported	  
by	  reasons,	  but	  that	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  actually	  studying	  the	  piano	  is	  equally	  supported.	  
This	  objection	  shows	  that	  there	  are	  two	  ways	  of	  interpreting	  the	  interim	  report	  view.	  On	  the	  
strong	  interpretation,	  the	  intention	  reports	  all	  the	  reasons	  there	  are.	  Clearly,	  this	  strong	  
interpretation	  is	  false	  if	  there	  are	  incompatible	  reasons:	  the	  intention	  to	  study	  the	  piano	  
does	  not	  reflect	  the	  reasons	  for	  dedicating	  one’s	  life	  to	  helping	  AIDS	  victims.	  On	  the	  weak	  
interpretation,	  the	  intention	  only	  reports	  one	  or	  more	  pro	  toto	  reasons	  for	  the	  action.	  It	  
need	  not	  be	  the	  report	  of	  all	  the	  reasons.	  The	  intention	  to	  study	  the	  piano,	  even	  if	  its	  
adoption	  is	  due	  to	  ‘picking’	  rather	  than	  choice,	  does	  display	  the	  pro	  toto	  reason	  for	  studying	  
the	  piano	  –	  but	  not	  the	  reasons	  for	  studying	  philosophy.	  It	  follows	  that	  on	  the	  weak	  
interpretation,	  the	  intention	  need	  not	  be	  a	  complete	  report	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  action.	  
Long-­‐term	  projects	  typically	  involve	  lots	  of	  smaller	  steps.	  If	  I	  adopt	  the	  project	  of	  learning	  to	  
play	  the	  piano,	  I	  have	  to	  study	  every	  day.	  Studying	  every	  day	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  overall	  
project	  of	  learning	  to	  play	  the	  piano	  does	  not	  make	  any	  sense.	  In	  other	  words,	  when	  you	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  ‘Picking’	  as	  opposed	  to	  ‘choosing’	  in	  the	  way	  characterized	  by	  Edna	  Ullmann-­‐Margalit	  and	  Sidney	  
Morgenbesser,	  “Picking	  and	  Choosing,”	  Social	  Research	  44	  (1977):	  757–785.	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adopt	  an	  end,	  you	  have	  an	  instrumental	  reason	  to	  pursue	  the	  means	  to	  that	  end.	  This	  
reason	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  intention.	  The	  question	  for	  the	  myth	  theorists	  
then	  is	  how	  to	  think	  of	  such	  instrumental	  reasons.	  How	  can	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  you	  picked	  
one	  project	  give	  you	  a	  reason	  that	  you	  did	  not	  have	  before?	  The	  most	  straightforward	  
suggestion	  is	  again	  that	  the	  intention	  gives	  you	  such	  instrumental	  reasons,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  
open	  to	  myth	  theorists,	  as	  it	  would	  open	  the	  door	  for	  questionable	  bootstrapping.	  	  
However,	  myth	  theorists	  have	  an	  alternative	  answer.	  Joseph	  Raz	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  
reasons	  to	  pursue	  the	  relevant	  means	  to	  an	  adopted	  end	  hold	  independently	  of	  the	  agent’s	  
intention.14	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  just	  as	  there	  is	  a	  reason	  to	  learn	  to	  play	  the	  piano,	  there	  is	  a	  
conditional	  reason	  of	  the	  form	  ‘if	  you	  have	  adopted	  the	  project	  of	  learning	  to	  play	  the	  piano,	  
you	  should	  study	  the	  piano	  everyday’.	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  general	  reason	  to	  pursue	  the	  
means	  relevant	  to	  your	  ends.	  While	  there	  are	  reasons	  to	  learn	  to	  play	  the	  piano	  and	  
conditional	  reasons	  to	  study	  everyday	  if	  you	  have	  formed	  the	  intention,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  
to	  kill	  one’s	  rich	  uncle	  and	  no	  conditional	  reason	  to	  acquire	  poison	  if	  one	  has	  adopted	  such	  
an	  intention.	  In	  this	  way,	  myth	  theory	  can	  explain	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  that	  intentions	  do	  not	  
themselves	  give	  reasons,	  but	  explain	  why	  intentions	  matter	  when	  settling	  on	  the	  means	  to	  
execute	  one’s	  intentions	  without	  any	  bootstrapping	  either	  of	  reasons	  for	  the	  ends	  or	  the	  
means	  for	  those	  ends.	  
The	  real	  problem	  for	  the	  interim	  report	  theory	  that	  underlies	  this	  version	  of	  the	  interim	  
report	  view	  is	  the	  following.	  Intending	  to	  φ	  implies	  inter	  alia	  that	  one	  is	  settled:	  φ-­‐ing	  is	  the	  
thing	  to	  do.	  The	  formation	  of	  an	  intention	  ends	  deliberation	  (at	  least,	  for	  the	  time).	  As	  we	  
have	  seen	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  an	  intention,	  in	  order	  to	  play	  its	  characteristic	  role	  in	  the	  
mental	  life	  of	  the	  agent,	  ‘stays	  on	  the	  scene’.	  In	  other	  words,	  intentions	  have	  inertia.	  Interim	  
reports	  do	  not.	  They	  are	  always	  provisional,	  ready	  to	  change.	  Hence,	  intentions	  cannot	  be	  
interim	  reports.	  
Myth	  theorists	  have	  an	  answer	  to	  this	  objection.	  In	  deliberating	  one	  spends	  precious	  
resources	  (attention,	  time,	  etc.).	  Spending	  such	  resources	  on	  a	  decision	  raises	  the	  
opportunity	  costs	  of	  reconsidering	  one’s	  decision,	  since	  spending	  resources	  on	  further	  
deliberation	  is	  reasonable	  only	  if	  the	  expected	  marginal	  value	  of	  the	  reconsidered	  intention	  
is	  such	  that	  it	  outweighs	  the	  costs	  of	  these	  resources.	  However,	  the	  expected	  marginal	  value	  
of	  continuing	  deliberation	  typically	  declines	  (assuming	  there	  is	  no	  new	  information,	  as	  I	  am	  
assuming	  here	  throughout).	  Therefore,	  at	  some	  point,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  continue	  
deliberating	  and	  one	  should	  settle	  on	  one’s	  intentions.	  	  
However,	  this	  also	  means	  that	  one	  has	  abandoned	  the	  interim	  report	  view	  and	  with	  it	  a	  
crucial	  building	  block	  of	  myth	  theory.	  For	  now	  it	  appears	  that	  intentions,	  or	  rather,	  the	  
whole	  of	  the	  deliberations	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  intentions,	  provide	  reasons	  
against	  reconsidering.	  So	  this	  is	  not	  a	  suggestion	  that	  will	  help	  the	  myth	  theorist	  in	  a	  way	  
that	  avoids	  bootstrapping.	  
Alternatively,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  an	  intention	  to	  φ	  only	  has	  the	  causal	  effect	  of	  
terminating	  deliberation	  (at	  least	  for	  now)	  about	  φ-­‐ing	  and	  that	  the	  inertia	  of	  intentions	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Raz,	  “The	  Myth	  of	  Instrumental	  Rationality.”	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not	  normative.	  Of	  course,	  this	  means	  rejecting	  part	  of	  the	  normative	  phenomenology	  of	  
intentions	  as	  discussed	  above.	  So	  the	  normative	  inertia	  of	  intentions	  spells	  trouble	  for	  the	  
way	  myth	  theory	  seeks	  to	  answer	  the	  challenge	  of	  avoiding	  bootstrapping	  and	  its	  
explanation	  of	  the	  normative	  phenomenology	  of	  intentions.	  
TWO-­‐FLAVOR	  THEORY	  
Denying	  that	  intentions	  are	  normative	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way	  to	  meet	  the	  challenge	  of	  avoiding	  
the	  bootstrapping	  while	  accounting	  for	  the	  normative	  phenomenology	  of	  intentions.	  The	  
other	  way	  is	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  characterization	  of	  reasons	  I	  proposed	  above	  is	  too	  broad.	  
A	  more	  refined	  distinction	  within	  the	  category	  of	  reasons	  can	  help	  to	  come	  to	  grips	  with	  the	  
normative	  phenomenology	  of	  intentions	  without	  any	  questionable	  bootstrapping.	  
One	  such	  a	  distinction	  is	  the	  well-­‐known	  distinction	  between	  external	  and	  internal	  reasons.15	  
Roughly,	  external	  reasons	  reside	  in	  mind-­‐independent	  facts	  whereas	  internal	  reasons	  are	  
mind-­‐dependent.	  These	  reasons	  operate	  independently	  of	  one	  another.	  If	  I	  am	  thirsty	  and	  
there	  is	  a	  glass	  in	  front	  of	  me	  with	  a	  clear	  fluid,	  which	  I	  believe	  to	  be	  water,	  I	  have	  a	  reason	  –	  
an	  internal	  reason	  –	  to	  drink	  its	  contents.	  If	  in	  reality	  I	  am	  mistaken	  and	  the	  fluid	  is	  actually	  
boric	  acid,	  I	  have	  have	  a	  reason	  –	  an	  external	  reason	  –	  not	  to	  drink	  its	  contents.	  There	  is	  not	  
contradiction	  here	  as	  internal	  and	  external	  reasons	  can	  exist	  independent	  of	  each	  other.	  We	  
can	  apply	  this	  distinction	  to	  the	  normativity	  of	  intentions	  and	  argue	  that	  intentions	  give	  
internal	  reasons	  to	  the	  agent,	  but	  not	  external	  reasons.	  Then	  by	  adopting	  an	  intention	  I	  do	  
not	  bootstrap	  new	  external	  reasons	  into	  existence,	  but	  I	  have	  brought	  a	  new	  internal	  reason	  
into	  the	  world.	  
This	  proposal	  will	  not	  work,	  first,	  because	  defined	  like	  this,	  it	  seems	  that	  all	  considerations	  
that	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  agent	  when	  deliberating	  are	  internal	  in	  this	  sense	  as	  one	  of	  the	  key	  
characteristics	  of	  reasons	  is	  that	  one	  can	  act	  upon	  them.	  Secondly,	  there	  may	  still	  be	  
questioning	  bootstrapping.	  For	  example,	  if	  I	  formed	  the	  intention	  to	  kill	  my	  rich	  uncle,	  on	  
this	  proposal,	  I	  would	  have	  bootstrapped	  an	  internal	  reason	  to	  kill	  my	  uncle	  into	  existence.	  
In	  short,	  this	  way	  of	  carving	  up	  the	  category	  of	  the	  normative	  does	  not	  really	  help.	  
However,	  it	  suggests	  how	  one	  could	  hang	  on	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  intentions	  have	  normative	  
pressure,	  while	  avoiding	  bootstrapping	  altogether.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  by	  making	  a	  distinction	  
between	  two	  kinds	  of	  normativity	  that	  function	  differently,	  you	  can	  avoid	  questionable	  
bootstrapping.	  This	  is	  the	  central	  insight	  of	  John	  Broome’s	  work	  on	  the	  requirements	  of	  
rationality.16	  For	  Broome,	  the	  central	  category	  is	  that	  of	  ‘ought’.	  Within	  this	  category,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Bernard	  Williams,	  “Internal	  and	  External	  Reasons,”	  in	  Moral	  Luck,	  ed.	  Bernard	  Williams	  (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1981),	  101–113.	  
16	  John	  Broome,	  “Normative	  Requirements,”	  Ratio:	  An	  International	  Journal	  of	  Analytic	  Philosophy	  12,	  
no.	  4	  (1999):	  398–419;	  Broome,	  “Are	  Intentions	  Reasons?	  And	  How	  Should	  We	  Cope	  with	  
Incommensurable	  Values?”;	  John	  Broome,	  “Practical	  Reasoning,”	  in	  Reason	  and	  Nature:	  Essays	  in	  the	  
Theory	  of	  Rationality	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  85–111;	  John	  Broome,	  “Reasons,”	  in	  
Reason	  and	  Value:	  Essays	  on	  the	  Moral	  Philosophy	  of	  Joseph	  Raz	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
2004);	  John	  Broome,	  “Does	  Rationality	  Give	  Us	  Reasons?,”	  Philosophical	  Issues	  15,	  no.	  1	  (2005):	  321–
337;	  John	  Broome,	  “Wide	  or	  Narrow	  Scope,”	  Mind	  116,	  no.	  462	  (April	  2007):	  359–370;	  John	  Broome,	  
“Reply	  to	  Southwood,	  Kearns	  and	  Star,	  and	  Cullity,”	  Ethics	  119,	  no.	  1	  (2008):	  96–108;	  John	  Broome,	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Broome	  distinguishes	  reasons	  from	  requirements.	  Reasons	  are	  those	  oughts	  that	  have	  
‘weight’	  and	  that	  are	  ‘slack’.	  This	  means	  that	  they	  can	  be	  overruled	  by	  other	  ‘stronger’	  or	  
‘weightier’	  reasons	  but	  that	  they	  stay	  on	  the	  scene.	  An	  example	  could	  be	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  
be	  kind	  to	  small	  children.	  Sometimes	  this	  is	  overruled	  by	  other	  reasons,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  cease	  
to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  be	  kind	  to	  small	  children,	  for	  even	  if	  you	  have	  to	  be	  unkind,	  
you	  should	  minimize	  your	  unkindness.	  Requirements,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  have	  no	  ‘weight’	  
and	  they	  are	  ‘strict’.	  You	  either	  satisfy	  them	  or	  you	  do	  not.	  Other	  requirements	  or	  reasons	  
do	  not	  outweigh	  them.	  They	  either	  apply	  or	  they	  don’t.	  An	  example	  could	  be	  the	  
requirement	  not	  to	  have	  inconsistent	  beliefs.	  17	  
This	  points	  to	  another	  distinctive	  feature	  of	  requirements.	  Requirements	  presuppose	  
standards.	  For	  example,	  the	  standards	  of	  classical	  logic	  require	  you	  not	  to	  believe	  both	  p	  and	  
not-­‐p.	  The	  standards	  of	  fencing	  require	  you	  to	  greet	  the	  opponent	  before	  the	  bout.	  
Rationality	  is	  such	  a	  standard	  as	  well.	  Reasons	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  have	  their	  ‘force’	  more	  or	  
less	  independent	  from	  standards.	  There	  is	  a	  reason	  to	  be	  kind	  to	  small	  children,	  but	  this	  
reason	  does	  not	  presuppose	  the	  existence	  of	  standards	  for	  child	  rearing.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  
another	  way	  of	  making	  this	  point	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  requirements	  do	  not	  necessarily	  have	  
authority.	  
Broome’s	  suggestion	  is	  that	  the	  normative	  pressures	  that	  come	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  
intentions	  (internal	  consistency,	  means-­‐end	  coherence,	  and	  inertia)	  are	  not	  reasons	  in	  his	  
sense,	  but	  requirements	  of	  rationality.	  Intentions	  do	  not	  create	  new	  reasons,	  but	  they	  do	  
put	  the	  agent	  under	  a	  requirement.	  This	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  completely	  rule	  out	  questionable	  
bootstrapping	  as	  it	  could	  still	  be	  the	  case	  that	  by	  forming	  an	  intention	  you	  are	  now	  under	  a	  
requirement	  of	  rationality	  to	  pursue	  the	  means,	  even	  if	  the	  intention	  or	  the	  necessary	  
means	  are	  evil.	  
Broome,	  in	  response,	  makes	  an	  additional	  distinction	  in	  scope:	  both	  reasons	  and	  
requirements	  can	  be	  wide-­‐scoped	  or	  narrow-­‐scoped.	  There	  is	  no	  Standard	  English	  to	  express	  
this	  distinction,	  so	  I	  will	  revert	  to	  a	  more	  formal	  notation.	  Take	  the	  requirement	  that	  you	  
ought	  to	  pursue	  the	  necessary	  means	  to	  your	  adopted	  ends.	  Let	  R	  stand	  for	  ‘rationally	  
required’	  then:	  
Wide-­‐scope:	  R(If	  you	  adopt	  the	  end,	  you	  pursue	  the	  necessary	  means)	  
Narrow-­‐scope:	  If	  you	  adopt	  the	  end,	  R(you	  pursue	  the	  necessary	  means).	  
The	  difference	  between	  those	  interpretations	  is	  that	  the	  wide-­‐scoped	  one	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  
detachment	  whereas	  the	  narrow-­‐scoped	  one	  does.	  That	  is,	  suppose	  you	  adopt	  an	  end,	  then,	  
under	  the	  wide-­‐scope	  interpretation,	  you	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  infer	  that	  you	  are	  required	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“The	  Unity	  of	  Reasoning?,”	  in	  Spheres	  of	  Reason:	  New	  Essays	  in	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Normativity,	  ed.	  
Simon	  Robertson	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  62–92.	  
17	  This	  points	  to	  another	  distinctive	  feature	  of	  requirements.	  Requirements	  come	  from	  standards.	  For	  
example,	  the	  standards	  of	  classical	  logic	  require	  you	  not	  to	  believe	  both	  p	  and	  not-­‐p.	  The	  standards	  of	  
fencing	  require	  you	  to	  greet	  the	  opponent	  before	  the	  bout.	  Rationality	  is	  such	  a	  standard	  as	  well.	  
Reasons	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  have	  their	  ‘force’	  more	  or	  less	  independent	  from	  standards.	  There	  is	  a	  
reason	  to	  be	  kind	  to	  small	  children,	  but	  this	  reason	  does	  not	  presuppose	  the	  existence	  of	  standards	  
for	  child	  rearing.	  Another	  way	  of	  making	  this	  point	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  requirements	  do	  not	  necessarily	  
have	  authority.	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pursue	  the	  necessary	  means.	  All	  you	  can	  infer	  is	  that	  you	  either	  ought	  to	  pursue	  the	  means	  
or	  give	  up	  the	  end.	  The	  narrow-­‐scoped	  interpretation	  of	  this	  requirement	  does	  allow	  for	  
detachment.	  Then,	  if	  you	  adopt	  the	  end,	  you	  should	  conclude	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  pursue	  the	  
necessary	  means.18	  Broome	  argues	  that	  the	  wide-­‐scope	  reading	  of	  the	  requirements	  of	  
rationality	  that	  comes	  with	  intentions	  is	  the	  correct	  one.	  When	  forming	  an	  intention	  you	  are	  
under	  a	  wide-­‐scope	  requirement	  of	  internal	  consistency	  and	  means-­‐end	  coherence.	  This	  
prevents	  all	  forms	  of	  bootstrapping	  by	  intentions	  for	  this	  means	  that	  there	  is	  no	  
requirement	  to	  choose	  the	  necessary	  means	  of	  one’s	  end.	  Rather,	  one	  is	  required	  either	  to	  
choose	  the	  necessary	  means	  or	  give	  up	  the	  end	  and	  repudiate	  one’s	  intention.	  No	  
bootstrapping	  of	  any	  sort,	  therefore,	  needs	  to	  occur	  when	  forming	  an	  intention.	  
The	  distinction	  between	  reasons	  and	  requirements	  of	  rationality	  is	  widely	  accepted	  in	  the	  
current	  literature.19	  There	  is	  considerable	  debate	  about	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  various	  
requirements,	  but	  that	  such	  distinction	  can	  be	  made	  is	  widely	  accepted.	  Similarly,	  there	  is	  
fierce	  debate	  about	  the	  status	  of	  the	  requirements	  of	  rationality.	  Some	  authors	  argue	  that	  
internal	  consistency	  and	  means-­‐end	  coherence	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  standards	  of	  theoretical	  
rationality	  (i.e.,	  the	  standards	  that	  guide	  proper	  reasoning	  about	  beliefs),	  whereas	  others	  
deny	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case.20	  Regardless	  of	  those	  points	  of	  disagreement,	  it	  is	  generally	  agreed	  
that	  one	  can	  avoid	  bootstrapping	  in	  the	  way	  two	  flavor	  theory	  suggests.	  
PROBLEMS	  FOR	  TWO	  FLAVOR	  THEORY	  
Nevertheless,	  there	  are	  still	  problems	  with	  this	  view.	  First,	  accepting	  the	  wide	  scope	  of	  
rationality	  requirements	  may	  still	  lead	  to	  questionable	  conclusions	  about	  the	  rational	  
admissibility	  of	  actions.	  If	  I	  intend	  to	  avail	  myself	  of	  an	  inheritance	  by	  poisoning	  my	  rich	  
uncle,	  on	  this	  proposal	  I	  am	  required	  either	  to	  give	  up	  this	  end	  or	  purchase	  some	  poison	  and	  
spike	  my	  uncle’s	  drink.	  So	  I	  am	  still	  allowed	  to	  poison	  my	  rich	  uncle:	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  
admissible	  ways	  of	  satisfying	  the	  requirement	  of	  means-­‐end	  coherence.	  Suppose,	  
furthermore,	  that	  I	  am	  unable	  to	  revise	  my	  intention	  to	  come	  into	  the	  possession	  of	  my	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Broome,	  “Normative	  Requirements,”	  403.	  
19	  For	  example,	  Mark	  Schroeder,	  “The	  Scope	  of	  Instrumental	  Reason,”	  Philosophical	  Perspectives	  18,	  
no.	  1	  (2004):	  337–364;	  Niko	  Kolodny,	  “State	  or	  Process	  Requirements?,”	  Mind	  116,	  no.	  462	  (2007):	  
371–385;	  Andrew	  Reisner,	  “Unifying	  the	  Requirements	  of	  Rationality,”	  Philosophical	  Explorations:	  An	  
International	  Journal	  for	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Mind	  and	  Action	  12,	  no.	  3	  (November	  5,	  2009):	  243	  –	  260;	  
Errol	  Lord,	  “Having	  Reasons	  and	  the	  Factoring	  Account,”	  Philosophical	  Studies	  149,	  no.	  3	  (2010);	  John	  
Brunero,	  “Instrumental	  Rationality,	  Symmetry	  and	  Scope,”	  Philosophical	  Studies	  157,	  no.	  1	  (2012):	  
125–140.	  
20	  Gilbert	  Harman,	  David	  Velleman,	  and	  Kieran	  Setiya	  defend	  the	  view	  that	  these	  requirements	  are	  
requirements	  of	  theoretical	  reason	  or	  ‘cognitivism’;	  Bratman	  and	  Brunero	  defend	  ‘noncognitivism’;	  
John	  Broome,	  finally,	  argues	  that	  neither	  of	  these	  extremes	  is	  plausible.	  Gilbert	  Harman,	  Change	  in	  
View:	  Principles	  of	  Reasoning	  (Cambridge:	  MIT	  Press,	  1986);	  J.	  David	  Velleman,	  “What	  Happens	  When	  
Someone	  Acts,”	  Mind	  101,	  no.	  403	  (1992):	  461–481;	  J.	  David	  Velleman,	  “Epistemic	  Freedom,”	  Pacific	  
Philosophical	  Quarterly	  70,	  no.	  March	  (1989):	  73–97;	  J.	  David	  Velleman,	  The	  Possibility	  of	  Practical	  
Reason	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000)	  Introduction;	  Setiya,	  “Cognitivism	  About	  Instrumental	  
Reason”;	  Michael	  E.	  Bratman,	  “Cognitivism	  About	  Practical	  Reason	  (Review	  of	  Practical	  Reflection,	  by	  
J.	  David	  Velleman),”	  Ethics	  102,	  no.	  1	  (1991):	  117–;	  Bratman,	  “Intention	  Rationality”;	  Bratman,	  
“Intention,	  Practical	  Rationality,	  and	  Self-­‐governance”;	  John	  Brunero,	  “Against	  Cognitivism	  About	  
Practical	  Rationality,”	  Philosophical	  Studies	  146,	  no.	  3	  (2009);	  Broome,	  “The	  Unity	  of	  Reasoning?”.	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inheritance	  through	  murdering	  the	  rich	  uncle,	  then	  it	  looks	  like	  it	  is	  not	  only	  admissible,	  but	  
also	  required.21	  Again,	  the	  specter	  of	  bootstrapping	  emerges.	  
There	  is	  a	  fair	  bit	  of	  discussion	  about	  what	  this	  objection	  actually	  shows	  about	  the	  claim	  that	  
the	  normative	  pressure	  that	  an	  intention	  puts	  on	  the	  agent	  is	  that	  of	  wide-­‐scoped	  
requirements.	  One	  way	  of	  addressing	  this	  objection	  is	  the	  route	  taken	  by	  David	  Velleman	  
and	  others,	  who	  argue	  that	  the	  requirements	  of	  intentions	  are	  requirements	  of	  rationality	  –	  
not	  morality	  or	  even	  prudence.	  Action	  need	  not	  be	  good	  or	  reasonable	  in	  order	  to	  be	  action.	  
Since	  action	  presupposes	  an	  intention,	  the	  general	  permissibility	  of	  satisfying	  the	  
requirement	  of	  means-­‐end	  coherence	  by	  pursuing	  the	  necessary	  means	  shows	  that	  when	  
one	  forms	  an	  intention,	  one	  need	  not	  form	  these	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  the	  good.	  22	  However,	  if	  
that	  is	  a	  plausible	  response,	  one	  starts	  to	  wonder	  what	  the	  problem	  with	  bootstrapping	  was	  
in	  the	  first	  place.	  If	  it	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  that	  requirements	  are	  sometimes	  can	  be	  
bootstrapped	  into	  existence,	  why	  argue	  that	  these	  requirements	  are	  wide-­‐scoped	  rather	  
than	  narrow-­‐scoped?23	  
A	  second	  problem	  for	  the	  two-­‐flavor	  theory	  more	  or	  less	  follows	  from	  this	  way	  out.	  If	  
requirements	  are	  to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  reasons	  as	  strictly	  as	  two-­‐flavor	  theory	  demands,	  
and	  if	  the	  requirements	  of	  rationality	  accompany	  intentions,	  then	  the	  question	  readily	  
emerges	  ‘why	  be	  rational?’	  Why	  satisfy	  these	  requirements?	  Indeed,	  why	  think	  rationality	  is	  
normative	  at	  all?	  It	  is	  one	  thing	  that	  rationality	  requires	  to	  be	  consistent	  in	  one’s	  attitudes,	  
but	  why	  should	  one	  treat	  these	  requirements	  any	  different	  than,	  say,	  the	  requirements	  of	  
fencing	  or	  etiquette?	  
Two	  distinctions	  that	  are	  made	  by	  Richard	  Joyce,	  following	  Foot,	  are	  useful	  here.24	  A	  
demand	  can	  be	  categorical	  or	  hypothetical.	  A	  demand	  is	  categorical	  if	  its	  applicability	  does	  
not	  depend	  on	  the	  ends	  of	  the	  agent	  who	  is	  addressed.	  A	  demand	  is	  hypothetical	  if	  its	  
applicability	  depends	  on	  the	  ends	  of	  the	  agent.	  Similarly,	  a	  demand	  can	  be	  authoritative	  or	  
lack	  authority.	  A	  demand	  is	  authoritative	  if	  the	  demand	  itself	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  doing	  as	  
demanded.	  Finally,	  a	  demand	  lacks	  authority	  if	  it	  does	  not	  give	  a	  reason.	  This	  two-­‐fold	  
distinction	  allows	  us	  to	  make	  precise	  the	  worry	  that	  wide-­‐scoped	  rationality	  requirements	  
are	  not	  normative.	  
All	  requirements	  are	  categorical	  demands:	  the	  requirements	  of	  etiquette	  demand	  that	  one	  
holds	  a	  knife	  in	  one’s	  right	  hand	  at	  dinner,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  one	  wants	  to	  or	  not	  –	  the	  
demand	  is	  still	  in	  place.	  However,	  the	  requirements	  of	  etiquette	  lack	  authority.	  There	  is	  no	  
particular	  reason	  to	  hold	  your	  knife	  in	  your	  right	  hand	  at	  dinner,	  even	  though	  etiquette	  
demands	  this	  categorically.	  Of	  course,	  there	  can	  be	  reasons	  to	  follow	  etiquette,	  but	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  etiquette	  the	  reason	  for	  doing	  so	  is	  not	  that	  it	  is	  demanded,	  but	  for	  some	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  For	  a	  version	  of	  this	  objection,	  see	  Setiya,	  “Cognitivism	  About	  Instrumental	  Reason.”	  A	  reply	  to	  this	  
objection	  is	  in	  Bratman,	  “Intention,	  Practical	  Rationality,	  and	  Self-­‐governance.”	  
22	  J.	  David	  Velleman,	  “The	  Guise	  of	  the	  Good,”	  Nous	  26,	  no.	  1	  (1992):	  3–26;	  Bratman,	  “Intention	  
Rationality.”	  For	  an	  opposing	  view,	  see	  Sergio	  Tenenbaum,	  Appearances	  of	  the	  Good:	  An	  Essay	  on	  the	  
Nature	  of	  Practical	  Reason	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007).	  
23	  See	  also	  Reisner,	  “Unifying	  the	  Requirements	  of	  Rationality.”	  
24	  Philippa	  Foot,	  “Morality	  as	  a	  System	  of	  Hypothetical	  Imperatives,”	  Philosophical	  Review	  81,	  no.	  3	  
(1972):	  305–316;	  Richard	  Joyce,	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Morality	  (MIT	  Press,	  2006).	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reason.	  For	  example,	  your	  reason	  can	  be	  that	  you	  want	  to	  impress	  your	  host.	  However,	  
there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  hold	  your	  knife	  in	  your	  right	  hand	  at	  dinner	  parties	  at	  each	  occasion	  
regardless	  of	  such	  further	  considerations.	  Questions	  about	  the	  normativity	  of	  etiquette	  then	  
are	  questions	  about	  its	  authority.	  
What	  about	  the	  requirements	  of	  rationality?	  Are	  they	  normative?	  Requirements	  of	  
rationality	  are	  strict	  and	  demand	  consistency	  between	  intentions	  and	  one’s	  beliefs	  and	  
other	  intentions.	  And	  this	  demand	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  specific	  interests	  or	  goals	  of	  the	  
agent.	  Clearly	  the	  requirements	  of	  rationality	  –	  just	  like	  those	  of	  etiquette	  –	  are	  categorical.	  
However,	  there	  is	  a	  question	  of	  their	  authority.	  Is	  there	  are	  reason	  to	  observe	  these	  
requirements	  in	  each	  and	  every	  occasion?	  Two-­‐flavor	  theorists	  respond	  differently	  to	  this	  
question	  about	  the	  normative	  authority	  of	  the	  requirements	  of	  rationality.	  Some	  are	  
skeptical	  and	  claim	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  be	  rational	  categorically.25	  Others	  are	  officially	  
agnostic	  and	  are	  open	  to	  the	  suggestion	  there	  is	  such	  a	  reason	  but	  are	  not	  convinced	  there	  
is.26	  Yet	  others	  claim	  to	  have	  found	  such	  reasons.27	  It	  goes	  too	  far	  to	  examine	  the	  various	  
proposals	  here,	  but	  one	  remark	  needs	  to	  be	  made.	  The	  candidate	  answers	  to	  this	  question	  
are	  of	  two	  types.	  First,	  there	  is	  the	  view	  that	  there	  is	  a	  reason	  in	  general	  to	  observe	  the	  
requirements	  that	  rationality	  demands	  of	  one’s	  intentions,	  because	  this	  has	  better	  results	  as	  
a	  policy	  than	  its	  counterpart.	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  proposal	  is	  that	  it	  amounts	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  
rule-­‐worship:	  while	  the	  policy	  may	  lead	  to	  desirable	  results	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  each	  and	  
every	  instant	  where	  the	  policy	  is	  applies	  leads	  to	  desirable	  results.28	  Secondly,	  there	  is	  the	  
view	  that	  these	  particular	  requirements	  of	  intention	  rationality	  are	  tied	  up	  to	  being	  an	  agent	  
and	  that	  there	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  inevitability	  about	  being	  an	  agent.29	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  view	  is	  
that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  imagine	  an	  agent	  who	  does	  not	  care	  about	  being	  an	  agent,	  in	  which	  case	  
the	  reason	  to	  be	  rational	  is	  not	  one	  that	  shows	  that	  necessarily	  in	  all	  cases	  rationality	  is	  
normative.	  That	  means	  that	  two-­‐flavor	  theory	  seems	  to	  fail	  in	  achieving	  its	  own	  goal	  of	  
establishing	  that	  intentions	  necessarily	  come	  with	  normative	  pressure.30	  Obviously,	  this	  is	  
not	  enough	  to	  dismiss	  two-­‐flavor	  theory.	  All	  I	  meant	  to	  do	  here	  is	  to	  flag	  some	  concerns	  that	  
will	  bother	  any	  attempt	  of	  accounting	  for	  the	  normativity	  of	  intentions	  by	  distinguishing	  
flavors	  of	  normativity.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  E.g.,	  Kolodny,	  “Why	  Be	  Rational?”.	  
26	  E.g.,	  Broome,	  “Does	  Rationality	  Give	  Us	  Reasons?”.	  
27	  E.g.,	  Bratman,	  “Intention,	  Practical	  Rationality,	  and	  Self-­‐governance”;	  Holton,	  Willing,	  Wanting,	  
Waiting.	  
28	  Broome,	  “Does	  Rationality	  Give	  Us	  Reasons?”;	  Bratman,	  “Intention	  Rationality.”	  For	  a	  defense	  see	  
Holton,	  Willing,	  Wanting,	  Waiting.	  
29	  E.g.,	  Velleman,	  “What	  Happens	  When	  Someone	  Acts”;	  Bratman,	  “Intention,	  Practical	  Rationality,	  
and	  Self-­‐governance.”	  But	  see	  David	  Enoch,	  “Agency,	  Shmagency:	  Why	  Normativity	  Won’t	  Come	  from	  
What	  Is	  Constitutive	  of	  Action,”	  Philosophical	  Review	  115,	  no.	  2	  (2006):	  169–198.	  
30	  Regardless	  which	  of	  these	  two	  views	  one	  accepts	  and	  regardless	  of	  how	  one	  answers	  these	  
particular	  objections,	  there	  is	  the	  further	  problem	  that	  these	  reasons	  are	  not	  the	  sort	  of	  reasons	  you	  
would	  expect	  if	  you	  take	  the	  distinctions	  between	  reasons	  and	  requirements	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  
narrow-­‐	  and	  wide	  scope	  on	  the	  other	  seriously.	  If	  you	  insist	  that	  the	  normative	  pressure	  of	  intentions	  
is	  really	  normative	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  avail	  yourself	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  wide-­‐scoped	  demands	  cannot	  
be	  detached,	  you	  would	  expect	  that	  a	  two-­‐flavor	  theory	  would	  look,	  not	  for	  a	  requirement	  but	  for	  a	  
wide-­‐scoped	  reason	  of	  the	  form	  that	  there	  is	  a	  reason	  to	  see	  to	  it	  that	  if	  you	  intend	  the	  end,	  you	  
pursue	  the	  necessary	  means.	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Perhaps	  both	  these	  problems	  –	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  admissible	  or	  even	  required	  execution	  of	  
evil	  intentions	  and	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  normativity	  of	  intention	  rationality	  requirements	  –	  
can	  be	  solved.	  There	  is	  a	  more	  serious	  flaw	  in	  the	  dominant	  version	  of	  two-­‐flavor	  theory:	  
what	  about	  the	  normative	  demand	  for	  inertia	  on	  this	  proposal?	  Above,	  I	  identified	  three	  
ways	  in	  which	  an	  intention	  can	  fail	  in	  a	  blameworthy	  manner.	  Intentions	  can	  fail	  to	  be	  
internally	  consistent;	  can	  fail	  to	  display	  means-­‐end	  coherence;	  or	  can	  fail	  due	  to	  fickleness.	  
The	  answer	  of	  the	  two-­‐flavor	  theory	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  intentions	  come	  with	  wide-­‐scoped	  
rationality	  requirements.	  Internal	  consistency	  and	  means-­‐end	  coherence	  can	  be	  casted	  as	  
wide-­‐scoped	  requirements.	  Both	  demand	  consistency	  between	  certain	  attitudes:	  between	  
beliefs	  and	  intentions	  and	  between	  goals	  and	  execution	  intentions	  respectively.	  	  
Inertia,	  however,	  is	  not	  a	  non-­‐detachable	  wide-­‐scoped	  requirement.	  It	  is	  simply	  a	  demand	  
that	  one	  be	  settled	  in	  one’s	  intention.	  It	  does	  not	  ask	  for	  coherence	  between	  attitudes,	  
rather,	  it	  demands	  something	  of	  individual	  attitudes.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  a	  demand	  that	  does	  
not	  fit	  the	  category	  of	  requirements	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  The	  demand	  for	  inertia	  is	  not	  strict:	  an	  
intention	  can	  satisfy	  inertia	  even	  though	  it	  is	  repudiated.	  Inertia	  clearly	  belongs	  in	  the	  
category	  of	  reasons:	  it	  has	  ‘weight’	  because	  it	  can	  be	  outweighed	  by	  other	  considerations	  
and	  it	  is	  ‘slack’.	  To	  see	  this	  last	  point,	  imagine	  that	  I	  am	  faced	  with	  two	  mutually	  exclusive	  
options	  A	  and	  B,	  which	  I	  judge	  to	  be	  equally	  good.	  There	  is	  some	  time	  pressure	  so	  I	  do	  have	  
to	  make	  a	  choice	  at	  t1	  between	  these	  options.	  I	  then	  decide	  to	  go	  for	  A	  and	  consequently	  
adopt	  the	  intention	  to	  go	  for	  A	  at	  t3.	  Suppose	  that	  at	  t2	  (right	  after	  t1	  but	  before	  t3)	  I	  
receive	  some	  new	  information	  that	  makes	  me	  doubt	  my	  initial	  judgment	  about	  the	  value	  of	  
A	  and	  B.	  I	  then	  reconsider	  and	  come	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  A	  and	  B	  are	  indeed	  equally	  good,	  
so	  I	  continue	  with	  my	  pursuit	  of	  A.	  I	  do	  not	  have	  to	  make	  a	  new	  decision.	  Rather,	  after	  a	  
quick	  check	  as	  to	  whether	  some	  key	  beliefs	  and	  judgments	  relevant	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  A	  are	  
justifiable	  to	  me,	  I	  proceed	  with	  the	  original	  intention.	  It	  stays	  on	  the	  scene	  in	  other	  words.	  I	  
would	  display	  blameworthy	  fickleness	  if	  I	  did	  not.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  reason	  to	  remain	  
settled	  in	  my	  intention	  is	  slack.	  Of	  course,	  this	  reason	  need	  not	  be	  very	  strong,	  but	  it	  is	  
there.	  Often	  the	  relative	  weakness	  of	  reasons	  makes	  us	  disregard	  these	  in	  our	  practical	  
deliberations	  as	  a	  pragmatic	  measure	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  abundance	  of	  reason	  considerations	  
only	  to	  re-­‐emerge	  when	  stronger	  reasons	  are	  absent.31	  I	  conclude	  that	  two-­‐flavor	  theory	  
cannot	  completely	  account	  for	  the	  normative	  phenomenology	  of	  intentions.	  
THE	  AUTHORITY	  OF	  INTENTION	  
So	  let	  us	  take	  stock	  of	  what	  has	  been	  accomplished	  so	  far.	  First,	  we	  discussed	  the	  naïve	  view	  
and	  found	  it	  allows	  for	  questionable	  bootstrapping.	  Next,	  we	  saw	  that	  both	  myth	  theory	  and	  
two-­‐flavor	  theory	  avoid	  bootstrapping,	  at	  least	  in	  their	  more	  sophisticated	  forms.	  Secondly,	  
both	  theories	  have	  difficulty	  accounting	  for	  the	  inertia	  of	  intentions.	  Myth	  theorists	  have	  
this	  difficulty	  because	  they	  either	  have	  to	  deny	  that	  this	  inertia	  is	  normative	  or	  they	  have	  to	  
accept	  that	  intentions	  do	  give	  reasons	  for	  inertia.	  Two-­‐flavor	  theorists	  have	  difficulty	  with	  
inertia	  because	  the	  logic	  of	  their	  theory	  requires	  that	  it	  be	  cast	  as	  a	  wide-­‐scoped	  rational	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  See	  also	  Mark	  Schroeder,	  Slaves	  of	  the	  Passions	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007).	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requirement.	  However,	  the	  pressure	  to	  inertia	  is	  neither	  wide-­‐scoped	  nor	  that	  of	  a	  
requirement.	  This	  brings	  us	  to	  my	  preferred	  view,	  the	  authority	  view.	  
According	  to	  the	  authority	  view,	  the	  key	  to	  these	  problems	  is	  the	  exaggerated	  fear	  of	  
bootstrapping.	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  propose	  a	  theory	  that,	  like	  the	  naïve	  explanation,	  does	  
imply	  that	  intentions	  sometimes	  bootstrap	  reasons	  into	  existence	  but	  that	  this	  is	  not	  
problematic	  in	  those	  instances.	  It	  shares	  with	  myth	  theory	  the	  view	  that	  there	  is	  not	  a	  
necessary	  and	  general	  pressure	  toward	  means-­‐end	  coherence.	  It	  shares	  with	  two-­‐flavor	  
theory	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  interim	  report	  theory	  and	  the	  endorsement	  of	  the	  normative	  
nature	  of	  intentions.	  It	  differs	  from	  two-­‐flavor	  theory	  in	  that	  the	  normativity	  of	  intentions	  is	  
authoritative	  rather	  than	  categorical	  and	  that	  it	  can	  account	  for	  true	  normative	  inertia.	  
The	  core	  idea	  of	  the	  authority	  view	  is	  to	  take	  seriously	  the	  analogy	  between	  intentions	  and	  
authoritative	  commands.32	  What	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  authority	  involved	  here?	  First	  take	  the	  idea	  of	  
political	  authority.33	  If	  such	  an	  authority	  issues	  an	  order,	  you	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  do	  as	  you	  are	  
told.	  People	  follow	  orders	  for	  all	  kinds	  of	  reasons.	  For	  example,	  you	  could	  do	  as	  you	  are	  told	  
because	  you	  mom	  raised	  you	  that	  way,	  or	  you	  could	  do	  it	  out	  of	  respect	  for	  certain	  
traditions,	  or,	  indeed,	  you	  could	  do	  as	  you	  are	  told	  for	  fear	  of	  the	  sanctions	  that	  might	  follow	  
if	  you	  do	  not	  obey.	  In	  all	  those	  cases,	  your	  reason	  for	  doing	  as	  you	  are	  told	  is	  not	  that	  the	  
political	  authority	  commanded	  this,	  but	  some	  other,	  independent	  reason.	  Rather	  than	  
obeying	  the	  authority,	  you	  are	  doing	  what	  you	  learned	  as	  a	  child,	  are	  following	  tradition,	  or	  
are	  avoiding	  sanctions.	  In	  those	  cases,	  I	  will	  say,	  you	  conform	  to	  the	  commands	  of	  the	  
authority,	  but	  you	  do	  not	  obey	  them.34	  Only	  if	  the	  very	  fact	  that	  the	  authority	  commanded	  
you	  to	  φ	  is	  your	  reason	  for	  φ-­‐ing	  you	  obey.	  Genuine	  authority	  –	  rather	  than	  merely	  claimed	  
or	  purported	  authority	  –	  then	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  give	  reasons	  to	  obey.	  
The	  decision	  of	  a	  genuine	  authority,	  then,	  is	  a	  reason	  to	  obey	  it.	  It	  is	  the	  decision	  –	  not	  the	  
content	  of	  that	  decision	  –	  that	  is	  your	  reason	  if	  you	  obey.	  Authorities,	  genuine	  authorities,	  
give,	  as	  Raz	  puts	  it,	  content-­‐independent	  reasons.35	  How	  could	  this	  be?	  How	  could	  the	  
decisions	  of	  an	  authority	  make	  such	  a	  difference?	  Think	  of	  a	  democratically	  elected	  
legislative	  body	  like	  a	  parliament.	  The	  acts	  of	  such	  a	  body	  are	  needed	  to	  make	  law.	  There	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  rely	  on	  Bruno	  Verbeek,	  “The	  Authority	  of	  Norms,”	  American	  Philosophical	  
Quarterly	  44,	  no.	  3	  (2007):	  245–258;	  Bruno	  Verbeek,	  “A	  Limited	  Defense	  of	  Voluntarism	  in	  Practical	  
Reason,”	  Unpublished	  Manuscript	  (Leiden,	  February	  12,	  2012).	  A	  similar,	  but	  not	  identical,	  view	  has	  
been	  developed	  by	  Govert	  den	  Hartogh,	  “The	  Authority	  of	  Intention,”	  Ethics	  115,	  no.	  1	  (2004):	  6–34.	  
Another	  version	  of	  this	  idea	  of	  authority	  exercised	  over	  oneself	  is	  in	  recent	  work	  by	  Ruth	  Chang.	  Ruth	  
Chang,	  “Voluntarist	  Reasons	  and	  the	  Sources	  of	  Normativity,”	  in	  Reasons	  for	  Action,	  ed.	  David	  Sobel	  
and	  Steven	  Wall	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2009);	  Ruth	  Chang,	  “Do	  We	  Have	  Normative	  Powers?”	  
(presented	  at	  the	  SLACCR,	  St.	  Louis,	  2010).	  
33	  The	  notion	  of	  authority	  that	  follows	  is	  roughly	  that	  of	  Joseph	  Raz’	  ‘service	  conception	  of	  authority’.	  
Joseph	  Raz,	  “Authority,	  Law	  and	  Morality,”	  Monist:	  An	  International	  Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  General	  
Philosophical	  Inquiry	  68,	  no.	  3	  (1985):	  295–324;	  Joseph	  Raz,	  The	  Morality	  of	  Freedom	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  1986);	  Joseph	  Raz,	  “The	  Problem	  of	  Authority:	  Revisiting	  the	  Service	  Conception,”	  
Minnesota	  Law	  Review	  90,	  no.	  4	  (2006):	  1003–1044.	  
34	  Note	  that	  I	  am	  using	  these	  terms	  in	  a	  technical	  meaning.	  The	  distinction	  is	  of	  course	  well	  known	  
from	  Kant’s	  distinction	  between	  ‘acting	  in	  conformity	  with	  duty’	  and	  ‘acting	  out	  of	  duty’.	  Immanuel	  
Kant,	  Groundwork	  for	  the	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals,	  ed.	  Lara	  Denis,	  trans.	  Thomas	  K.	  Abbott	  (Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2002/1785).	  
35	  Raz,	  The	  Morality	  of	  Freedom,	  35–37.	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may	  be	  all	  kinds	  of	  reasons	  pertaining	  as	  to	  which	  laws	  this	  body	  should	  pass,	  reasons	  having	  
to	  do	  with	  justice,	  efficiency,	  etc.	  In	  addition,	  there	  are	  procedural	  rules	  such	  that	  when	  a	  
parliament	  acts	  on	  these	  reasons	  and	  follows	  these	  procedures,	  there	  is	  law.	  The	  decision	  of	  
the	  parliament	  is	  crucial	  for	  making	  law.	  Without	  that	  decision	  there	  is	  no	  law.	  Once	  the	  law	  
is	  there,	  some	  citizens	  will	  conform	  to	  the	  law,	  out	  of	  fear	  for	  sanctions	  or	  because	  they	  
think	  the	  law	  just	  and	  good.	  Laws,	  just	  like	  other	  authoritative	  commands	  and	  decisions,	  give	  
content-­‐independent	  reasons	  to	  those	  subjected	  to	  it.36	  Law,	  then,	  makes	  a	  practical	  
difference	  to	  those	  subjected	  to	  it.	  The	  passing	  of	  a	  law	  by	  a	  legislative	  authority	  bootstraps	  
a	  reason	  –	  a	  reason	  to	  obey	  –	  into	  existence.	  That	  reasons	  is	  a	  content-­‐independent	  reason:	  
it	  is	  not	  the	  content	  of	  the	  law	  that	  has	  the	  legal	  authority,	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  the	  law	  is	  
the	  reason	  to	  obey.	  
Political	  and	  legislative	  authorities	  are	  not	  unlimited.	  A	  parliament,	  for	  example,	  cannot	  
exercise	  authority	  over	  areas	  that	  not	  within	  its	  constitutional	  powers.	  In	  addition	  to	  such	  
constitutional	  limitations,	  there	  are	  considerations	  of	  justice,	  morality	  and	  efficiency	  that	  
limit	  the	  amount	  and	  the	  scope	  of	  authority.	  However,	  in	  those	  areas	  that	  fall	  within	  its	  
authority	  parliament	  has	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  discretion.	  If	  setting	  the	  level	  of	  VAT	  is	  within	  
the	  scope	  of	  the	  authority	  of	  a	  parliament,	  it	  has	  discretion	  as	  to	  how	  high	  that	  level	  should	  
be.	  Therefore,	  though	  genuine	  authority	  is	  limited	  it	  also	  has	  discretion:	  there	  is	  a	  range	  of	  
options,	  which,	  if	  commanded,	  give	  those	  subject	  to	  it	  a	  reason	  to	  obey.	  
The	  claim	  of	  the	  authority	  view	  of	  the	  normativity	  of	  intentions	  is	  that	  intentions	  have	  
authority	  in	  exactly	  this	  sense.	  If	  I	  intend	  at	  t1	  to	  φ	  at	  t2,	  this	  intention	  gives	  me	  a	  reason	  to	  
φ	  at	  t2.	  This	  reason	  is	  content-­‐independent.	  It	  independent	  of	  the	  intrinsic	  features	  of	  φ-­‐ing	  
at	  t2,	  but	  it	  does	  make	  a	  difference.	  As	  a	  result,	  intentions	  do	  not	  merely	  transfer	  or	  report	  
the	  reasons	  for	  φ-­‐ing,	  they	  bootstrap	  a	  content-­‐independent	  reason	  into	  existence.	  One	  of	  
the	  reasons	  that	  justify	  φ-­‐ing	  at	  t2	  is	  that	  it	  is	  the	  agent’s	  unrepudiated	  intention.	  However,	  
just	  like	  political	  and	  legal	  authority	  the	  authority	  of	  intentions	  is	  limited.	  There	  are	  all	  kinds	  
of	  background	  considerations	  that	  limit,	  normatively	  speaking,	  the	  sorts	  of	  things	  one	  can	  
intend.	  
THE	  EPISTEMIC	  AUTHORITY	  OF	  INTENTIONS	  
Having	  staked	  the	  claim,	  we	  can	  now	  proceed	  to	  see	  if	  it	  is	  plausible.	  What	  we	  need	  is	  some	  
explanation	  of	  how	  intentions	  can	  come	  to	  have	  such	  authority.	  To	  see	  how,	  we,	  again,	  turn	  
to	  the	  inter-­‐individual	  case	  and	  investigate	  how	  agents	  can	  come	  to	  have	  authority	  over	  
others.	  As	  far	  as	  I	  am	  aware	  there	  are	  two	  types	  of	  authority	  that	  can	  hold	  between	  
individuals.	  The	  first	  is	  epistemic	  authority.	  Epistemic	  authority	  is	  authority	  based	  on	  a	  
superior	  epistemic	  position	  to	  those	  subject	  to	  that	  authority.	  A	  good	  example	  is	  the	  
authority	  of	  a	  physician.	  Imagine	  that	  you	  have	  a	  persistent	  headache	  that	  will	  not	  go	  away.	  
You	  could	  consult	  a	  medical	  encyclopedia	  or	  Wikipedia.	  Alternatively,	  you	  could	  visit	  your	  
physician	  and	  ask	  her	  what	  to	  do.	  Suppose	  she	  diagnoses	  you	  with	  migraine	  and	  prescribes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Assuming,	  of	  course,	  that	  the	  law	  has	  authority.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  trivial	  assumption.	  For	  a	  critical	  
discussion,	  see	  A.	  John	  Simmons,	  Moral	  Principles	  and	  Political	  Obligations	  (Princeton	  University	  
Press,	  1979).	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sumatriptan	  (a	  well	  known	  medicine	  against	  the	  effects	  of	  migraine).	  Now	  you	  have	  a	  reason	  
to	  take	  sumatriptan.	  Your	  reason	  is	  that	  she	  prescribed	  it.	  Why	  is	  that	  a	  reason?	  Because	  
your	  physician	  is	  in	  a	  better	  epistemic	  situation	  than	  you	  are	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  
considerations	  that	  are	  relevant	  for	  your	  condition.	  She	  is,	  in	  other	  words,	  an	  epistemic	  
authority.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  her	  prescription	  merely	  reports	  or	  transfers	  the	  reasons	  for	  
taking	  sumatriptan	  (the	  specifics	  of	  your	  migraine,	  the	  biochemical	  properties	  of	  
sumatriptan).	  Rather,	  you	  take	  her	  word	  for	  it:	  it	  is	  her	  saying	  so	  that	  provides	  your	  
justification	  for	  taking	  sumatriptan.	  Like	  all	  genuine	  authorities,	  the	  authority	  of	  your	  
physician	  is	  limited.	  Were	  she	  to	  prescribe,	  say,	  liberal	  daily	  doses	  of	  heroine,	  her	  
prescription	  would	  have	  no	  authority.	  The	  scope	  of	  what	  she	  can	  prescribe	  is	  limited.	  
Furthermore,	  she	  has	  discretion.	  Instead	  of	  sumatriptan,	  she	  could	  prescribe	  any	  of	  the	  
other	  available	  triptans,	  and	  you	  would	  still	  have	  reason	  to	  obey	  her	  prescription.	  Note,	  
moreover,	  that	  it	  need	  not	  be	  the	  case	  that	  sumatriptan	  is	  the	  best	  medicine	  for	  you.	  It	  may	  
very	  well	  be	  that	  naratriptan	  is	  better	  for	  you.	  Still,	  since	  you	  are	  in	  no	  position	  to	  know	  and	  
she	  is,	  you	  have	  reason	  to	  follow	  her	  prescription.	  The	  physician’s	  discretion	  extends	  to	  less	  
than	  optimal	  options.	  Epistemic	  authority,	  then,	  issues	  content-­‐independent	  reasons	  that	  
make	  a	  practical	  difference,	  and	  is	  limited	  and	  discretionary.	  Notice	  that	  epistemic	  authority	  
is	  not	  absolute.	  Nothing	  stops	  you	  from	  seeking	  a	  second	  opinion.	  Even	  if	  the	  second	  opinion	  
overrules	  the	  prescriptions	  of	  the	  first	  physician,	  that	  prescription	  still	  carries	  weight	  in	  
determining	  what	  to	  do.	  Hence,	  the	  prescriptions	  of	  an	  epistemic	  authority	  are	  authoritative	  
reasons	  and	  not	  categorical	  requirements.	  
Intentions	  can	  have	  such	  epistemic	  authority	  as	  well.	  For	  example,	  for	  a	  while	  I	  received	  
unsolicited	  phone	  calls	  usually	  around	  dinnertime	  from	  phone	  companies	  trying	  to	  persuade	  
me	  to	  switch	  to	  a	  different	  provider.	  Because	  dinnertime	  is	  hectic	  (food	  needs	  to	  be	  cooked,	  
kids	  need	  to	  be	  fed,	  etc.)	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  come	  to	  a	  judgment	  about	  the	  merits	  of	  their	  
proposals.	  Therefore,	  I	  have	  decided	  not	  to	  conduct	  that	  kind	  of	  business	  over	  the	  phone.	  In	  
forming	  this	  intention,	  I	  have	  exercised	  authority	  over	  myself.	  At	  dinnertime	  my	  capacity	  for	  
judging	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  various	  proposals	  is	  impeded.	  My	  decision	  not	  to	  conduct	  this	  kind	  
of	  business	  over	  the	  phone	  at	  dinnertime	  was	  made	  under	  more	  favorable	  epistemic	  
circumstances.	  My	  earlier	  decision	  has	  authority	  because	  it	  was	  made	  under	  more	  conducive	  
circumstances.	  My	  reason	  for	  refusing	  the	  offer	  to	  switch	  phone	  plan	  is	  my	  earlier	  decision.	  
Hence,	  I	  have	  a	  content-­‐independent	  reason:	  it	  is	  not	  what	  I	  have	  decided	  that	  gives	  me	  
reason,	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  decided	  that	  is	  my	  reason.	  The	  authority	  of	  my	  decision	  is	  not	  
absolute:	  I	  can	  revise	  my	  decision	  when	  I	  believe	  a	  really	  good	  opportunity	  is	  there.	  
However,	  the	  weight	  of	  that	  consideration	  has	  to	  be	  higher	  to	  accept	  the	  offer	  than	  it	  has	  to	  
be	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  intention	  not	  to	  conduct	  business	  over	  the	  phone.	  The	  epistemic	  
authority	  of	  my	  intention	  is	  limited:	  if	  I	  decided	  to	  throw	  the	  phone	  out	  of	  the	  window	  next	  
time	  I	  receive	  a	  dinner	  time	  call,	  then,	  presumably,	  that	  decision	  does	  not	  carry	  any	  weight	  
when	  the	  phone	  company	  calls.	  The	  authority	  of	  my	  intention	  comes	  with	  discretion:	  I	  could	  
have	  decided	  to	  accept	  an	  offer	  if	  it	  meets	  certain	  criteria,	  I	  could	  have	  decided	  to	  ask	  for	  
written	  materials	  to	  consider	  their	  offer	  at	  a	  more	  appropriate	  time.	  All	  of	  these	  things	  I	  
could	  have	  adopted	  as	  an	  intention	  in	  order	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  limitations	  on	  my	  capacity	  for	  
coming	  to	  a	  well-­‐considered	  decision	  during	  dinnertime.	  Note	  that	  my	  discretion	  even	  
extends	  to	  adopting	  less	  than	  optimal	  courses	  of	  action.	  Maybe	  a	  particular	  offer	  really	  is	  a	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good	  deal.	  However,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  my	  earlier	  decision,	  I	  am	  justified	  in	  refusing.	  The	  
epistemic	  authority	  of	  intentions	  is	  not	  a	  surprising	  or	  accidental	  feature,	  for	  if	  we	  take	  
seriously	  the	  constraints	  on	  our	  deliberation,	  this	  is	  exactly	  what	  we	  would	  expect.	  The	  
rationale	  for	  forming	  intentions	  is	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  heat-­‐of-­‐the-­‐moment,	  on-­‐the-­‐spot	  
constraints	  on	  our	  deliberation.	  It	  can	  only	  do	  that	  if	  the	  future-­‐oriented	  intentions	  we	  
formed	  then	  structure	  our	  deliberations	  now.	  
Intentions,	  therefore,	  sometimes	  have	  epistemic	  authority.	  Notice,	  however,	  that	  they	  need	  
not	  necessarily	  have	  such	  authority.	  If	  the	  agent	  decides	  something	  that	  is	  beyond	  the	  limits	  
of	  her	  authority	  or	  if	  the	  agent	  is	  not	  in	  an	  epistemic	  superior	  position	  relative	  to	  the	  time	  of	  
execution,	  its	  adoption	  does	  not	  give	  the	  agent	  a	  content-­‐independent	  reason	  to	  do	  as	  
decided.	  So	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  intentions	  always	  bootstrap	  reasons	  into	  existence.	  In	  this	  
way,	  the	  exercise	  of	  epistemic	  authority	  over	  one’s	  future	  selves	  does	  not	  result	  in	  
questionable	  bootstrapping.	  Intentions	  only	  give	  reasons	  if	  they	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  
background	  reasons,	  i.e.,	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  authority,	  and	  if	  they	  are	  issued	  from	  an	  
epistemic	  superior	  position.	  So	  while	  intentions	  do	  (sometimes)	  bootstrap	  reasons	  into	  
existence,	  this	  bootstrapping	  is	  not	  troubling.	  
THE	  COORDINATIVE	  AUTHORITY	  OF	  INTENTIONS	  
Epistemic	  authority	  is	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  individuals	  can	  exercise	  authority	  over	  one	  
another.	  The	  other	  way	  in	  which	  authority	  can	  be	  exercised	  is	  through	  coordination.	  This	  
typically	  will	  be	  the	  case	  when	  there	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  collective	  action	  problem	  that	  requires	  
mutual	  adjustment	  in	  behavior.	  For	  example,	  imagine	  that	  the	  Titanic	  is	  sinking	  and	  all	  the	  
passengers	  want	  to	  abandon	  the	  vessel	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible.	  The	  Titanic	  is	  a	  big	  ship	  and	  
carries	  lots	  of	  passengers	  so	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  how	  each	  individual	  is	  supposed	  to	  do	  that,	  
independent	  of	  what	  the	  other	  passengers	  are	  going	  to	  do.	  Suppose	  that	  the	  life	  boats	  carry	  
only	  a	  limited	  number,	  then	  my	  decision	  to	  go	  to	  the	  first	  lifeboat	  on	  the	  left	  depends	  on	  
where	  other	  passengers	  are	  going.	  If	  lots	  of	  others	  will	  make	  for	  that	  lifeboat,	  I	  am	  better	  of	  
trying	  to	  get	  into	  the	  first	  lifeboat	  on	  the	  right.	  But	  of	  course,	  the	  same	  holds	  for	  each	  other	  
individual	  passenger.	  We	  face	  a	  coordination	  problem:	  for	  each	  of	  us	  to	  achieve	  our	  goals	  
we	  depend	  on	  what	  others	  will	  do	  and	  vice	  versa.	  These	  are	  all	  the	  reasons	  we	  have.	  
Suppose	  at	  that	  moment	  the	  captain	  appears	  on	  the	  bridge	  and	  orders,	  say,	  the	  passengers	  
in	  the	  salon	  to	  go	  to	  the	  first	  lifeboat	  on	  the	  left	  and	  the	  other	  passengers	  to	  go	  to	  the	  
lifeboat	  on	  the	  right.	  Now	  each	  of	  the	  passengers	  in	  the	  salon	  will	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  go	  to	  the	  
left.	  The	  passengers	  from	  the	  other	  decks	  will	  expect	  the	  other	  passengers	  in	  the	  salon	  to	  go	  
to	  the	  left,	  so	  they	  should	  go	  to	  the	  right.	  And	  because	  they	  will	  go	  to	  the	  right,	  the	  
passengers	  from	  the	  salon	  should	  go	  to	  the	  left,	  for	  there	  they	  are	  now	  assured	  they	  will	  find	  
a	  place	  in	  the	  left	  lifeboat.	  The	  captain	  in	  this	  little	  story	  has	  exercised	  authority.	  He	  does	  not	  
have	  this	  authority	  (just)	  based	  on	  his	  superior	  experience	  and	  knowledge	  of	  what	  to	  do	  in	  
situations	  like	  this.	  Rather,	  through	  his	  commands	  the	  passengers	  are	  able	  to	  achieve	  
successful	  coordination.	  The	  captain’s	  commands	  give	  each	  passenger	  reason	  to	  expect	  
what	  others	  will	  do	  and	  where	  he	  or	  she	  can	  find	  a	  place	  in	  a	  lifeboat.	  The	  captain’s	  
authority	  is	  limited.	  Were	  he	  to	  command	  us	  all	  to	  assemble	  in	  the	  salon	  in	  order	  to	  listen	  to	  
the	  orchestra	  playing,	  he	  would	  not	  have	  given	  us	  any	  reason	  to	  go	  there.	  By	  ordering	  some	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to	  go	  left	  and	  others	  to	  go	  right,	  he	  has	  given	  us	  a	  reason	  to	  do	  as	  he	  told	  us.	  Notice	  that	  the	  
captain	  has	  discretion.	  He	  could	  have	  ordered	  the	  salon	  passengers	  to	  go	  to	  the	  lifeboat	  on	  
the	  right;	  he	  could	  have	  ordered	  women	  and	  children	  to	  go	  there,	  etc.	  There	  are	  plenty	  of	  
ways	  to	  abandon	  ship	  in	  an	  orderly	  fashion.	  Notice,	  furthermore,	  that	  the	  particular	  order	  of	  
the	  captain	  need	  not	  be	  the	  very	  best	  way	  to	  abandon	  ship.	  The	  fact	  that	  he	  ordered	  it	  and	  
that	  it	  is	  good	  enough	  in	  comparison	  to	  no	  coordination	  at	  all,	  gives	  the	  passengers	  reason	  
to	  do	  as	  they	  are	  told.	  Note,	  finally,	  that	  the	  reason	  that	  the	  captain	  gives	  the	  passengers	  is	  
content-­‐independent:	  it	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  ordered	  so-­‐and-­‐so	  that	  gives	  them	  reason	  to	  do	  
as	  they	  are	  told,	  not	  what	  he	  has	  ordered	  them	  to	  do.	  
Can	  intentions	  have	  similar	  authority?	  Elsewhere	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  they	  can.37	  Bratman	  
explicitly	  mentions	  one	  way	  in	  which	  intentions	  achieve	  coordination.38	  By	  their	  hierarchical	  
nature,	  intentions	  achieve	  coordination	  over	  time.	  I	  hesitate	  to	  adopt	  this	  suggestion	  here.	  
There	  is	  no	  mutual	  adjustment	  in	  behavior	  between	  my	  selves	  over	  time	  as	  there	  is	  between	  
individuals.	  Me	  at	  t2	  cannot	  do	  anything	  that	  would	  influence	  the	  decisions	  of	  me	  at	  t1.	  
Some	  argue	  that	  therefore	  the	  only	  kind	  of	  authority	  intentions	  exercise	  is	  epistemic.39	  
However,	  that	  is	  not	  correct.	  There	  are	  other	  ways	  in	  which	  intentions	  do	  exercise	  authority	  
that	  reminds	  us	  of	  the	  way	  the	  captain	  of	  the	  Titanic	  exercised	  authority	  over	  the	  
passengers.	  
Like	  most	  mothers,	  Mom	  loves	  her	  two	  children,	  Alice	  and	  Bill.	  She	  would	  like	  to	  give	  them	  
both	  a	  treat.	  Unfortunately,	  she	  can	  give	  only	  one	  of	  them	  a	  treat.	  Since	  both	  children	  are	  
equally	  deserving,	  needy	  and	  desirous,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  for	  preferring	  either	  child.	  
Therefore,	  Mom	  is	  indifferent	  between	  the	  outcome	  in	  which	  Alice	  receives	  the	  treat	  (A),	  
and	  the	  outcome	  in	  which	  Bill	  receives	  the	  treat	  (B).	  Rather	  than	  just	  arbitrarily	  picking	  A	  or	  
B,	  she	  should	  do	  so	  in	  a	  fair	  manner.	  She	  should	  flip	  a	  fair	  coin	  and	  let	  it	  decide	  who	  gets	  the	  
treat.40	  Note	  that	  this	  is	  fair:	  giving	  the	  treat	  to	  one	  of	  her	  children	  using	  this	  device	  is	  better	  
(since	  fair)	  than	  giving	  it	  to	  one	  of	  them	  straightaway.	  Assuming	  for	  now	  that	  flipping	  the	  fair	  
coin	  is	  the	  only	  method	  available	  Mom	  has	  two	  possible	  courses	  of	  action	  available	  that	  
would	  do	  the	  trick.	  She	  could	  do	  A	  (i.e.,	  give	  Alice	  the	  treat)	  if	  ‘heads’	  comes	  up	  and	  B	  when	  
‘tails’	  comes	  up.	  Alternatively,	  she	  could	  decide	  to	  do	  B	  if	  ‘heads’	  comes	  up	  and	  A	  if	  ‘tails’	  
comes	  up.	  	  
Suppose	  that	  Mom	  has	  decided	  for	  the	  former.	  That	  is,	  she	  has	  formed	  at	  t1	  an	  intention	  of	  
the	  form	  ‘A	  if	  heads;	  B	  if	  tails’.	  She	  then	  flips	  the	  coin	  and	  heads	  comes	  up	  at	  t2.	  Again	  she	  
faces	  the	  choice	  between	  A	  and	  B.	  Both	  children	  are	  still	  equally	  deserving,	  needy	  and	  keen	  
on	  the	  treat,	  so	  it	  still	  seems	  that	  the	  reasons	  are	  equally	  strong.	  However,	  that	  is	  incorrect.	  
Having	  made	  the	  decision	  to	  do	  A	  if	  heads	  comes	  up	  makes	  it	  the	  case	  that	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  do	  A	  
now	  that	  heads	  has	  come	  up.	  Bill	  cannot	  complain	  that	  he	  is	  as	  needy	  and	  deserving	  as	  Alice.	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  Bruno	  Verbeek,	  “Rational	  Self-­‐Commitment,”	  in	  Rationality	  and	  Commitment,	  ed.	  Fabienne	  Peter	  
and	  Hans	  Bernhard	  Schmid	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  150–174;	  Verbeek,	  “A	  Limited	  
Defense	  of	  Voluntarism	  in	  Practical	  Reason.”	  
38	  Bratman,	  Intention,	  Plans,	  and	  Practical	  Reason.	  
39	  Den	  Hartogh,	  “The	  Authority	  of	  Intention.”	  
40	  Or	  any	  other	  fair	  way	  –	  i.e.,	  a	  way	  that	  gives	  equal	  weight	  to	  A	  and	  B	  –	  to	  break	  the	  tie	  between	  A	  
and	  B	  in	  a	  fair	  manner.	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Nor	  can	  he	  demand	  Mom	  to	  flip	  the	  coin	  again,	  claiming	  that	  after	  flipping	  the	  coin	  is	  better	  
than	  just	  arbitrarily	  giving	  it	  to	  Alice.	  He	  has	  had	  his	  chance.	  Mom’s	  decision	  thus	  has	  
created	  a	  reason	  of	  fairness	  to	  give	  the	  treat	  to	  Alice.	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  this	  situation	  Mom’s	  
earlier	  decision	  has	  created	  a	  reason	  that	  did	  not	  exist	  before.	  
Notice	  that	  here	  too	  Mom’s	  authority	  is	  limited.	  She	  is	  not	  allowed	  to	  settle	  who	  should	  get	  
the	  treat	  in	  an	  unfair	  manner.	  Also,	  Mom	  has	  discretion:	  there	  are	  lots	  of	  fair	  ways	  of	  
settling	  the	  question	  as	  to	  who	  should	  get	  the	  treat.	  Mom’s	  decision	  makes	  a	  practical	  
difference.	  Without	  it,	  there	  would	  still	  be	  indifference	  as	  to	  who	  should	  get	  the	  treat.	  
Notice,	  finally,	  that	  Mom’s	  decision	  has	  created	  a	  content-­‐independent	  reason.	  This	  is	  a	  bit	  
more	  complicated	  than	  in	  the	  case	  of	  epistemic	  intentional	  authority.	  What	  is	  Mom’s	  reason	  
for	  giving	  the	  treat	  to	  A?	  Because	  it	  is	  fair.	  Why	  is	  it	  fair?	  Because	  it	  is	  what	  the	  coin	  flip	  
dictated	  her	  to	  do.	  Why	  is	  that	  what	  the	  coin	  flip	  dictated	  her	  to	  do?	  Her	  initial	  decision	  to	  
observe	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  coin	  flip	  gave	  her	  this	  reason.	  In	  other	  words,	  because	  this	  is	  
what	  she	  decided	  to	  do.	  So	  here	  too,	  we	  see	  that	  intentions	  can	  give	  an	  agent	  reasons	  
authoritatively.	  The	  claim	  that	  intentions	  have	  authority,	  therefore,	  is	  plausible.	  It	  accounts	  
for	  the	  normative	  phenomenology	  of	  intentions	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  avoiding	  
questionable	  bootstrapping.	  
CONCLUSION	  
In	  this	  essay,	  I	  argued,	  first	  that	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  accept	  that	  intentions	  come	  with	  
normative	  pressure.	  These	  pressures	  include	  demands	  for	  consistency	  with	  other	  attitudes	  
of	  the	  agent,	  such	  as	  his	  beliefs,	  his	  other	  intentions,	  the	  means	  to	  be	  intended,	  as	  well	  as	  
inertia.	  These	  demands	  create	  a	  challenge	  for	  philosophers:	  to	  account	  for	  these	  pressures	  
without	  reverting	  to	  questionable	  bootstrapping.	  I	  discussed	  three	  alternative	  views	  that	  try	  
to	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  normative	  phenomenology.	  The	  first	  view,	  myth	  theory,	  denies	  that	  
intentions	  have	  any	  normative	  pressure	  on	  the	  agent	  and	  presents	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  
this	  nevertheless	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  a	  species	  of	  error	  theory.	  I	  argued	  
that	  myth	  theory	  could	  not	  be	  maintained	  in	  the	  light	  of	  all	  the	  specific	  normative	  pressures	  
of	  intentions.	  The	  second	  view	  I	  discussed,	  two-­‐flavor	  theory,	  accepts	  that	  intentions	  create	  
normative	  pressure	  on	  the	  agent,	  but	  denies	  that	  this	  pressure	  is	  that	  of	  reasons.	  Instead,	  
the	  adoption	  of	  an	  intention	  puts	  the	  agent	  under	  wide-­‐scoped	  rationality	  requirements.	  I	  
argued	  that	  two-­‐flavor	  theory	  is	  implausible	  when	  considering	  the	  inertia	  of	  intentions	  as	  
well	  as	  when	  one	  wonders	  whether	  there	  are	  any	  reasons	  to	  observe	  the	  requirements	  of	  
rationality	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
I	  then	  proceeded	  to	  suggest	  a	  third	  view:	  the	  authority	  view.	  On	  this	  view	  intentions	  do	  
sometimes	  create	  reasons	  for	  the	  agent.	  However,	  as	  with	  myth	  theory,	  this	  is	  not	  always	  
and	  necessarily	  the	  case.	  Secondly,	  these	  reasons	  are	  constrained	  by	  all	  kinds	  of	  background	  
considerations	  that	  both	  limit	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  agent	  over	  herself	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
give	  her	  discretion.	  The	  authority	  view	  does	  imply	  that	  intentions	  themselves	  come	  with	  
normative	  pressure	  just	  like	  two-­‐flavor	  theory.	  
Of	  course,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  full	  defense	  of	  the	  authority	  view.	  A	  proper	  defense	  will	  have	  to	  point	  
out	  how	  authoritative	  intentions	  have	  the	  specific	  normative	  pressures	  associated	  with	  
	   22	  
intentions	  as	  well	  as	  answer	  a	  number	  of	  additional	  objections	  specifically	  targeted	  at	  the	  
authority	  view.	  All	  that	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  do	  here	  is	  suggest	  an	  alternative	  view	  to	  the	  prevailing	  
doctrines.	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